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THE ECONOMIC TREATMENT OF 
AUTOMOBILE INJURIES 
Alfred F. Conard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
T HE automobile has changed more than Americans' ways of trans-portation. It has changed their ways of housing, of working and 
playing, of eating, living, and loving. It has also added to their ways 
of suffering and dying. 
The suffering and dying have called forth two kinds of treatment. 
The better recognized kind is medical treatment, which staves off 
death and minimizes pain and disability among the living. The less 
recognized kind of treatment is economic-the restoration to the 
injury victim or to his dependents of some part of the economic well-
being that has been snatched away from them by loss of income 
and by the costs of medical treatment. 
Although the economic treatment has reached sizable dimensions 
-probably about 2.5 billion dollars a year in the United States1-
until recently, little attention has been given to its scope, its func-
tions, and its additions to or subtractions from the national welfare. 
Such attention as it has attracted has been directed chiefly to aspects of 
the remedy provided by tort law-the long waiting lists for jury trial, 
the alleged pursuit of claimants by "ambulance-chasers," the take 
of claimants' lawyers, and the failure of many motorists to insure 
adequately against liability.2 Information on these topics may illumi-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. The author acknowledges the 
imaginative and efficient research assistance of Mr. J. Ethan Jacobs, an assistant editor 
of the Michigan Law Review. 
1. This estimate covers payments for automobile-related injuries made by liability 
insurers, life and health insurers, and social security and other social insurance systems. 
The amount of automobile liability insurance pay-outs in 1960 was reported as about 
1.5 billion dollars. A recent survey indicates that liability insurance pay-outs amount 
to about half of total loss shifting on account of automobile accidents. CONARD, 
MORGAN, PRATI, VOLTZ 8: BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT Cos-rs AND PAYMENTS: 
STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 1-19, 151 fig. 4-1, 174 fig. 5-10 (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as AACP]. 
2. On delay, see LEVIN &: WOOLLEY, DISPATCH AND DELAY: A FIELD STUDY OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA (1961); ZEISEL, KALVIN &: BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE 
COURT (1959); Rosenberg &: Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Liti-
gation, 59 CoLUM, L. REv. Ill5 (1959); see also Zeise! &: Callahan, Split Trials and 
Time Saving: A. Statistical Analysis, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1606 (1963). 
For an interesting popular description of the operations of a successful ambulance 
chaser, see The Saturday Evening Post, March 23, 1957, p. 19; see also DRINKER, LEGAL 
ETHICS 64 (1953). 
On the high cost of compensation collection, see Franklin, Chanin 8: Mark, A.cci-
[279] 
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nate the work of lawyers and judges, but it throws little light on the 
plight of the injury victims. 
Fortunately, attention is belatedly shifting from the problems 
of jurists to those of injured people. Within the past ten years, a 
remarkable body of information concerning economic treatment has 
emerged. For the first time since the parameters of the problem 
were radically revised by the birth of the welfare state,8 observers 
have the means of viewing the problem of economic treatment with 
a reasonably broad grasp of its magnitude and of the spectrum of 
phenomena that it includes. 
The most comprehensive of the reports containing this new in-
formation is a state, national, and international study of injury 
reparation produced at The University of Michigan by an interdis-
ciplinary and international team of researchers and contributorsJ 
Two other comprehensive studies of automobile injury consequences 
have been produced by John F. Adams of Temple University, 
based upon surveys in Philadelphia and New Jersey.5 A more nar-
dents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 
61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 20-!l0 (1961); see also Bloom, When the Lawyer Gets the Spoils, 
Readers Digest, March 1960, p. 105. 
On failure to insure adequately against liability, see LaBrum, Time for Action: 
The Problem of Motorists' Insurance, 45 A.B.A.J. 692, 691! (1959); see generally 
GREGORY 8: KAI.VEN, CAsEs ON TORTS 71l!l-42 (1959). Report number 1 of the [Michigan] 
Governor's Commission To Study the Problem of the Uninsured Motorist (1958) 
[unbound and unpublished], indicates at note !l that, while the uninsured and 
financially irresponsible motorists are about 10% of the total number of motorists, 
they are involved in slightly more than 20% of the accidents. 
On simulated or exaggerated claims, see Gannon, Insurance Cheats, Wall St. J., 
Aug. 28, 1964, p. 1, col. I. · 
!l. In the last year before the F. D. Roosevelt administration, a comprehensive study 
of automobile accidents was published. REPORT BY THE COMMITI'EE TO STUDY CoMPEN· 
SATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (Columbia Univ. Council for Research in the 
Social Sciences, 1932) (hereinafter cited as THE COLUMBIA REPORT]. Much of the infor-
mation it contains has dubious application today because of the subsequent rise of the 
social security system and other devices for providing aid to the injured. 
4. AACP. The central feature of this report is a survey of automobile injury victims 
throughout the state of Michigan, indicating the kinds and extent of their economic 
losses and the reparation that they reap from tort law, from private life and health insur-
ance, from social security, from poor relief, and from other sources. The survey includes 
significant information on the causes of dispute, the delay in collecting reparation, and 
the personal opinions and reactions of lawyers and their clients. Another section of the 
study compares the national volume costs of reparation through the tort law system 
with those of reparation by way of private loss insurance, social security, and other 
regimes; this section also contains analyses of the social objectives and achievements of 
the various systems. In a third section of the study, four foreign contributors explain 
how similar problems are handled in England, France, Germany, and Sweden. 
5. Adams, A Survey of the Economic-Financial Consequences of Personal Injuries 
Resulting from Automobile Accidents in the City of Philadelphia, 1953, Temple Univ. 
Economics 8: Business Bull., March 1955 (hereinafter cited as Adams '55]. It is based 
upon interviews with accident victims in the city of Philadelphia and produced rather 
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rowly focused study, with sharply outlined conclusions on the ade-
quacy of reparation, was made by a research team at the University 
of Pennsylvania, based upon accidents occurring in 1956 in the 
Philadelphia metropolitan area.6 A wealth of information on the 
attitudes and behavior of injury victims was yielded by a study of 
minor injury cases in New York City. Under the title, "Who Sues 
in New York?," this provocative and readable volume probed the 
motivation of injury victims in deciding to sue or not to sue, as 
affected by the extent of their injuries, their contributory negligence 
or lack of it, their lawyer contacts, and other elements.7 
In addition to these studies focused on reparation, there are a 
number of important studies conducted from engineering and 
medical points of view on the causes and consequences of accidents. 
The highway departments of several states, with encouragement and 
guidance from the Federal Bureau of Public Roads, have conducted 
studies of the total "direct costs" of automobile accidents.8 Engineer-
ing studies of accident causes that consider elements of automotive 
startling evidence that about 30% of the accidents were caused by uninsured automo-
biles, although the percentage of uninsured automobiles registered was considerably 
less. It also demonstrated for the first time the frequency and significance of sources of 
reparation other than tort liability. In addition, this report presented illuminating 
information and trenchant comments on settlement procedures of liability insurance 
companies and on the attitudes of injury victims. 
Adams, A Comparative Analysis of Costs of Insuring Against Losses Due to Auto-
mobile Accidents: Various Hypotheses-New Jersey, 1955, Temple Univ. Economics &: 
Business Bull., March 1960 [hereinafter cited as Adams '60]. It was based upon a state-
wide sample of automobile accidents in New Jersey and was undertaken in order to 
estimate the increase in costs that would result from substituting a compensation sys-
tem for the existing tort liability system. In the course of this survey, rather specific 
estimates were made of the amounts contributed to reparation by the various regimes 
at work, with the indication that tort liability furnishes less than half of the total 
reparation that victims receive. 
6. Morris &: Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, llO U. PA. L. 
REv. 913 (1962). Like the Michigan and the Adams surveys, this one included repara-
tion from loss insurance and social security as well as sums paid to discharge tort 
liability. 
7. Hur-mNG &: NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? (1962). 
8. COST OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS TO ILUNOIS MOTORISTS, 1958 (Ill. Dept. of Pub. 
Works and Bldgs., Div. of Highways, 1962). There is a summary of this information in 
Billingsley &: Jorgenson, Analyses of Direct Costs and Frequencies of Illinois Motor-Ve-
hicle Accidents, 1958, Public Roads, Aug. 1963, p. 201. A symposium in Public Roads, 
June 1960, p. 33, entitled "Four Articles on Traffic Accident Costs" compares accident 
data from Utah and Massachusetts. Similar statistics were compiled in New Mexico, 
but have not been put in a form generally available to the public. 
These studies are directed toward accident costs per vehicle mile on different kinds 
of roads, but they supply some useful points for comparison with the reparation sur-
veys as to the number and distribution of personal injury accidents. They also contain 
some arresting indications that more money is paid for legal services than for health 
services as a result of accidents and produce impressively high figures for the amount of 
"awards in excess of known costs." 
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design and apparatus have been published by the Cornell University 
Automotive Crash Injury Research program.9 Medical studies of 
fatality cases, with autopsies on automobiles and victims alike, have 
been conducted at the Harvard School of Public Health10 and, more 
recently, at the University of Michigan School of Medicine.11 
II. RESULTS OF THE NEW RESEARCH 
The results of the new research make it possible to view injury 
treatment as a problem of human suffering and deprivation, rather 
than as a problem of tort theory, judicial administration, or pro-
fessional ethics. To appreciate the difference, one must look back 
over the products of the mental exertions of legal scholars relating 
to automobile injuries in the past half century. 
Through the years, foremost attention in the literature of the law 
has been given to those problems that are chiefly involved in the deci-
sions of appellate courts, which, in the Langdellian tradition, are 
the prime working material of "legal science."12 On this plane, the 
main subject of attack has been the principle of contributory neg-
ligence, whereby an injury victim is denied any compensation under 
tort law if he has contributed to his injury by any fault of his own. 
Researchers have contended that the doctrine of "comparative neg-
ligence" is more in accord with moral ideas of the community18 or 
have measured the effects on procedure and insurance costs of such 
a change.14 
9. The results of these studies have been published as monographs on the effective• 
ness of seat belts, safety window glass, padded instrument panels, and other elements. 
A list may be obtained on request from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc., 
P.O. Box 235, Buffalo 21, New York; a summary of major findings is published ;n 
HUMAN FACTORS IN TECHNOLOGY 230-36 (1963); O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 
5~ Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 334-56 (1963), contains an interesting discussion of the possi-
bilities suggested by these studies for improvement in automobile safety. 
10. REsEARCH ON FATAL HIGHWAY COLLISIONS, PAPERS 1961-62 (Moseley ed.); id., 
PAPERS 1962-63 (Moseley ed.). See also They're Finding 'Why' in Auto Wrecks, Journal 
of American Insurance, Nov. 1963, p. I. These studies emphasize the safety potentiality 
of design and apparatus, but they also indicate the presence of suicidal or homicidal 
elements in far more automobile "accidents" than previously had been thought likely. 
11. Gikas & Huelke, Causes of Death in Automobile Accidents: Can Seat Belts 
Really Save Lives? 63 J. MICH. s. MEDICAL Soc'Y 351 (1964). 
12. "First, that law is a science; secondly, that all the available materials of that 
science are contained in printed books." C. C. Langdell, 1886, quoted in 2 "WARREN, 
HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 374 (1908). 
13. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Re-
form, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases 
(pts. 1-2), 99 U. PA. L. REv. 572, 766 (1951); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. 
L. REv. 465 (1953); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March (pts. 1-2), 28 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 189, 304 (1950). 
14. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 MICH. L. 
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On a similar plane of inquiry, critics of the existing law have 
attacked the rules affecting the rights of guests and members of the 
family of the guilty driver or of the vicariously liable automobile 
owner.111 Some find it immoral that the guest should be able to sue 
his host or the child his parent, while others find it just as revolting 
that he should be forbidden to do so. 
A more recent wave of research has stepped down from the 
altitudes of legal principles, as formulated by appellate courts, to the 
goings-on in the trial courts. Here a principal concern has been 
delay in getting to trial, with weighty studies investigating the 
length of the delays and the effectiveness of various attempts to 
shorten the waiting time.16 Another subject of concern among the 
trial investigators has been the medical witnesses and the startling 
conflicts in their "expert testimony."17 Significant experiments have 
been launched in New York and Illinois to test the effectiveness of 
substituting "impartial" expert witnesses, nominated by the court, 
for the "partisan" witnesses procured by the respective antagonists 
in the struggle.18 
A third type of research has stepped out of the courtroom and into 
the Ia·wyer's office to investigate the costs of hiring lawyers to recover 
compensation for injury claimants, with or without suit.19 
Valuable as these studies have been, most of them have the limita-
tion that they focus on the business of lawyers-appeals, trials, and 
client representation. The legal researcher learns all that is in them, 
only to find that he still knows very little about the people who are 
injured in automobile accidents and how they have been impov-
erished or enriched; he has no idea whether there are some other 
people who do not find, or are not found by, claimants' compensa-
tion attorneys and, if so, whether the people who stay outside the 
toils of lawyers and court proceedings are a small minority or the 
great majority of the injury victims. 
A researcher who is interested in people will necessarily demand 
studies that tell him something about people who escape the law's 
toils as well as about those who get into them; he will be less inter-
REY. 689 (1960); Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" 
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REY. 89 (1959). 
15. See, e.g., Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of 
Risk, 22 LA. L. REY. 90 (1961). 
16. See authorities on delay cited in note 2 supra. 
17. See, e.g., Symposium, 34 TEMPLE L. Q. 476 (1961); Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 
700 (1961). 
18. Ibid. 
19. Franklin, Chanin, &: Mark, supra note 2. 
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ested in how long trials are delayed than in how many accident 
victims are never compensated at all. 
If such data are demanded by a legal researcher, they must be 
even more essential to an appraisal of the problem by an economist, 
a sociologist, or a public-health physician. Thus, it is striking that the 
impact of automobile injuries has attracted such minimal attention 
from social scientists, who have poured forth their efforts on indus-
trial injuries,20 which are less costly in the aggregate than automobile 
injuries.21 The trouble seems to be that there has been no supply of 
the kinds of facts about automobile injuries that would be of interest 
to a social scientist. He does not care much about tort theory, and he 
sees trial delay and lawyers' fees as narrow problems, of interest only 
to a clique of specialists. 
The.purpose of the new research is to supply data that are use-
ful for viewing injury reparation as a community problem that is 
not only legal but also social and economic. Such a view will help 
to preserve or remold reparation to the advantage not only of appel-
late judges, trial lawyers, litigants, and law professors but also of the 
common man who suffers injury and pays insurance premiums. 
This research is "new" not only because it is recent; it is also 
new in approach. It is not like the research of the Committee to 
Study Compensation for Automobile Injuries,22 which was directed 
(taking the most charitable view) toward finding whether a particular 
plan was better or worse in its entirety than the tort law system; nor 
is it like the bits of subsequent research directed toward answering 
the same question.23 It is multi-purpose research. Without doubt, it 
may intensify the convictions of those who wish to displace tort law 
with a compensation system. It may supply ammunition also to the 
protagonists of the tort system. But it is designed primarily to 
illuminate the facts, not to polarize them. 
20. See, e.g., the bibliographic notes in SOMERS &: SOMERS, 'WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION (1954); see also the current bibliographies, "Book Reviews and Notes" in Monthly 
Labor Review, and "Recent Publications" in Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
21. The National Safety Council reports that in 1962, 13,700 people died in work 
related accidents and two million suffered injuries that disabled them beyond the day 
of the accident. For the same period, 40,900 died in motor vehicle accidents and I.5 
million suffered injuries that disabled them beyond the day of the accident. The 
Council reports that the "cost" of work related accidents in 1962 was five billion dol-
lars, while the "cost" of motor vehicle accidents in the same year was 7.5 billion dollars. 
(A motor vehicle accident that happens during the course of the injurcd's employment 
is counted both as a motor vehicle accident and as a work accident.) NATIONAL SAFETY 
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 3, 5 (1963 ed.). See also note 76 infra. 
22. THE COLUMBIA REPORT. 
23. See James &: Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too 
Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B. J. 70 (1952). 
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A. The Persistence of Injury Claims 
Since most of the existing literature about injury victims concerns 
litigation processes, a social observer might wonder at the outset 
what fraction of the injury cases persist to the litigation stage. A 
capsule answer may be given in the form of a table, starting with 
the number of people who suffer losses in personal injury automobile 
accidents and comparing the numbers who persist to various suc-
cessive stages-hiring a lawyer, filing suit, commencing a trial, and 
appealing a judgment. Taking all the injury cases. as one hundred 
per cent, the Michigan survey indicated the following persistence 
frequencies: 24 
Persons Persons Persons Persons 
with hiring starting appealing 
losses lawyers trial to higher 
court 
100% 14% 0.6% 0.1% 
This table refers to the totality of persons who suffer economic 
loss in personal in jury accidents. A researcher into "law in action" 
would presumably be interested in this totality, since tort law 
purports to provide the same standards for injuries of all degrees 
and the famous principle "de minimis" does not exclude tort in-
juries, however minute.25 
A social scientist might prefer to confine his attention to cases 
that present some significant impact on productivity and welfare. 
For this reason, the Michigan study selected a group of "serious in-
jury cases," defined as cases in which the injury victim had medical 
expenses of five hundred dollars or more, was hospitalized for two 
weeks or more, suffered a permanent physical impairment, or died. 
For these cases the persistence was as follows: 26 
Suffering Hiring Commencing 
serious lawyers trial 
injury 
100% 
Appealing 
to higher 
court 
Even in this group, the legal apparatus touched less than half the 
24. AACP 155 fig. 4-3, 241 fig. 7-2. 
25. "The maxim [De minimis non curat lex] has no application to money demands." 
BALLENTINE, LAW DICTIONARY 356 (1948 ed.). Although they do not explicitly so state, 
the following works take this interpretation for their starting assumption in the calcu-
lation of damages in actions for negligence: HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.1 (1956); 
McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 124 (a), 137 (1935); PROSSER, TOR1'S § 35 (d) (2d ed. 1955). 
26. AACP 184 fig. 6-1, 241 fig. 7-2. 
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injured persons, the trial process less than a tenth, and appellate 
proceedings less than a hundredth. 
These figures raise considerable doubt about what can be achie-
ved for injury victims by improving the procedure of trial courts. 
Even if courtroom procedures were ideally speedy, dignified, and 
objective, their excellence would remain unfelt by ninety-five per 
cent of the serious cases and the ninety-nine plus per cent of all 
cases which are settled outside of court. 
Improvement of trial procedures would improve the lot of the 
mass of claimants only if all claimants could readily obtain a prompt 
and fair trial. If that were true, settlement would naturally reflect 
the expected result of such a trial. A contemplation of this possibility 
leads to a second implication of the statistics. If a trial were obtained 
by just one out of every nineteen of the serious injury victims who 
now settle without trial, the number of trials conducted would 
have to increase by one hundred per cent. A minute decrease in the 
settlement rate would deluge the already overcrowded courts with 
an even more oppressive mass of cases. 
This observation leads to other conclusions. One is that the furn-
ishing of speedy trials is likely to require a multiplication of court-
rooms, judges, and juries far beyond anything that has been discussed 
by the students of the law's delays. If trial facilities are not greatly 
multiplied, no improvement in trial procedures is likely to do much 
for nineteen-twentieths of the litigants. Improvements that make 
court procedures more attractive will only increase the congestion. 
A more likely means of reducing congestion is to find some method 
of facilitating settlement without the necessity of trial. 
B. The Sources of Reparation 
Most of the prior information regarding compensation for injury 
victims' losses has been directed single-mindedly at "damages" 
paid because of adjudged or presumed liability of a "tortfeasor" to 
an injury claimant. The main text of the Columbia report,27 and 
the follow-up by a Yale group in 1950,28 reported only about these 
payments. A part of the Columbia report that reported on com-
pensation from other sources was relegated to an appendix and was 
ignored in the Columbia recommendations.29 
In the meantime, there has been a gigantic rise of new sources 
27. THE COLUMBIA REPORT. 
28. James & Law, supra note 23. 
29. THE COLUMBIA REPORT 218. 
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of help likely to benefit an injury victim or his survivors. The first 
of these is the system of survivors' benefits under the Old Age and 
Survivors' Insurance program of the Social Security Administration 
authorized by Congress in 1935.30 Because of this program, the 
widow of a fatal injury victim is now assured of lifetime assistance 
regardless of success in her claim for damages, provided her husband 
was part of the vast working population that is covered by the 
Social Security program. By 1960, this program offered potential 
benefits to about eighty per cent of United States families.31 
The second invader of the reparation scene was health insurance, 
which began a meteoric growth about 1940 and now covers, in one 
form or another, about seventy per cent of Americans.32 
The third entrant on the reparation stage was the Social Security 
program of disability benefits, which began for older persons in 
1956,88 but which first reached out to a majority of the working 
population in November 1960.34 
One of the striking discoveries of the last decade's research has 
been the impact of the first two of these programs, along with other 
rights outside the realm of tort law, on the welfare of injury victims. 
The third of the items-the disability program-arrived too late 
to be reflected in any of the studies published up to the time of 
this writing. 
Several surveys-two in Philadelphia, one in New Jersey, and 
one in Michigan-have indicated that a half-dozen sources of com-
pensation for accident losses have been added to "damages" under 
tort law.35 The first Philadelphia study and the Michigan study 
30. 49 Stat. 622 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-22 (1958), as amended, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 401-22 (Supp. V, 1964). 
31. Eighty-seven per cent of employed persons are potentially protected by Social 
Security Survivors Insurance. AACP 42 table 1-1. To become a "fully insured individ-
ual," however, one must be in covered employment for any forty quarters, or for one-
fourth of the quarters between 1950 or his twenty-first birthday, whichever is later, 
and his date of death or retirement, whichever is earlier, but at least six quarters. 
Those who died before 1950 needed at least six quarters of coverage. 75 Stat. 137 (1961), 
42 U.S.C. § 414 (Supp. V, 1964). 
32. AACP 42 table 1-1, 71 fig. 1-3. 
3!l. 70 Stat. 815 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423-25 (1958). 
34. 74 Stat. 967 (1960), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (Supp. V, 1964). 
35. AACP 146 table 4-8 shows the following percentages of persons injured in 
automobile accidents who received some compensation from the following sources: in-
jury victim's own insurance, 63%; tort liability settlements, 49%; employer [including 
sick leave], 4%; workmen's compensation, I%: social security and other pensions, 
1 %: others, 3%, The total exceeds 100% because some respondents reported more than 
one source of reparation. 
Table 19 of Adams '60, at 26, shows the following percentages of persons injured 
in automobile accidents who received some compensation from the following sources: 
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provide quantitative estimates of the amounts received from some 
of these programs. They indicate that tort damages provided only 
about half of the total help that injury victims received.86 
For two reasons, the actual contribution of the non-tort programs 
is probably greater than the fifty per cent indicated by the Philadel-
phia and Michigan studies. One reason is the more rapid growth in 
the total social security and health insurance programs than in the 
tort liability program.81 In all likelihood, each doubling of health 
insurance or OASDI volume is accompanied by an approximate 
doubling of their contribution to automobile injury victims. A sec-
ond reason for believing that the non-tort programs are greater 
than indicated is that the conservative methods of estimation used 
in the various surveys tended to understate social security payments 
much more than they understated damage payments. In the Phil-
adelphia studies, only benefits already received were counted; future 
respondent's own insurance, 33.80%: the other party's insurance, 34.64%: the other 
party personally, 3.93%; the respondent personally, 21.46%; temporary disability or un-
employment insurance, 2.17%; workmen's compensation, 2.38%: other and unknown 
sources [chiefly intra-family loans], 1.68%. The total equals exactly 100% because the 
percentages were taken not with respect to the number of people responding, but with 
respect to the total number of responses. 
36. AACP 147 table 4-9 shows the following percentages of the aggregate amount 
of reparation received from various sources: tort liability settlements, 55%: injured 
person's own insurance, 38%; social security, 2%; employer [including sick leave), 1%: 
workmen's compensation, less than ½ of I%: other, 4%. 
Table 36, and the text at page 38 of Adams '60 show the following percentages of 
the aggregate amount of reparation from the various sources: victim's insurer 37.07%: 
other party's insurer, 32.42%; other party personally, 2.88%: respondent personally, 
24.42%: temporary disability, unemployment insurance, and workmen's compensation, 
3.21%. 
AACP defined a class of injury victims labeled "serious" and studied these in addi-
tion to the general class of all personal injury accident victims. The arbitrary definition 
of a serious injury was one that (1) required hospitalization for three weeks or more; or 
(2) occasioned hospital and medical expenses of five hundred dollars or more; or (3) 
occasioned death or some degree of permanent physical impairment. Figure 5-10, p. 
174, shows the following percentage distribution of aggregate amounts of reparation 
from the various sources in serious injury cases: tort liability, 46%; own insurance 
[principally life, hospital-medical, and automobile insurance), 27%; future compensa-
tion expected [principally death and disability benefits under federal social security], 
14%; others, 13%. 
37. Pay-outs for disability and death by OASDI (the federal old age, survivors, and 
disability insurance program) in 1960 were more than two hundred times those in 
1940. STATISTICAL AllsrnACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1962, at 284. Pay-outs by automobile 
liability insurance companies for the same periods are not available, but premiums for 
automobile bodily injury liability in 1960 were about ten times those in 1940. IN-
SURANCE STATISTICS, 1962, at 8. Although the growth rates of social insurance and health 
insurance were not radically different from liability insurance during the 1950's, the 
broad legislative extensions of disability insurance in 1960, 74 Stat. 967 (1960), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 423 (Supp. V, 1964), and of health insurance in 1962, 76 Stat. 197 (1962), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1381-85 (Supp. V, 1964), seems to presage further surge of volume in the social and 
health insurance areas. See generally AACP 71 fig. 1-3. 
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benefits were excluded as too speculative.38 Since social security 
benefits are generally paid in monthly instalments over a lifetime, 
the exclusion of future payments resulted in their gross under-
statement. 
There should be less understatement of social security benefits 
in the Michigan survey, where future social security benefits were 
estimated and included in the reparation total. But the future instal-
ments were entered at discounted values in order to facilitate 
comparison with damage payments and other lump sum payments. 
In fact, they are eventually paid in full, not in discounted sums. 
Thus, a more valid comparison would be one that would show the 
actual amounts received throughout life from social security benefits 
and the actual amounts received throughout life by damage claimants 
from lump sum settlements plus any interest or profits received from 
investing them. But this ideal projection would require an impossible 
foreknowledge. Therefore, the more conservative statement of dis-
counted present values had to be followed, despite its known bias.39 
In the light of these revelations about the sources of reparation, 
it is no longer satisfactory to analyze the welfare of injury victims 
in terms of what they get in damages. The analysis must be in re-
lation to the entire retinue of programs for the aid of the stricken. 
These include health insurance, old age and disability insurance, 
life insurance, collision and personal property insurance, sick leave 
pay, workmen's compensation, public assistance, charity, and some 
additional sources.40 
C. The Costs of Loss Shifting 
A third disclosure of the new studies is the fantastic variations 
in the costs of distributing help in the various systems and the high 
rate of expense of the damage system in relation to the benefits that 
it distributes. 
An impeccably documented study of lawyers' fees in New York 
County showed that more than a third of the total amount of money 
paid out as damages for personal injuries went to the claimants' 
lawyers.41 In Michigan a statewide survey of collection expenses 
38. Morris &: Paul, supra note 6; Adams '55. 
39. See AACP 372, 374 table 9-19 for a more complete explanation of the discount-
ing of future payments of money to compute present value. 
40. For example, a Veteran's Administration or municipal hospital may give free, or 
virtually free, medical care in many cases. Surveys frequently do not or cannot count 
this and consequently deal only with the money actually paid or promised to the in-
jury victim. Cf. AACP 170-75. 
41. Franklin, Chanin &: Mark, supra note 2, at 21, 25 chart III. 
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(including lawyers' fees) showed them amounting to about a quarter 
of the gross settlements.42 The broadly based Illinois study indicated 
that more money was spent on legal expenses arising out of acci-
dents in that state than was spent for medical treatment.43 The New 
Jersey survey indicated high collection expenses, although no over-
all ratio estimate was attempted.44 
The Michigan study also estimated total expenses of the damage 
system, adding to lawyers' fees the litigation expenses of claimants 
themselves, the costs of selling and administering insurance, and 
the costs of keeping courts open for injury cases.45 This summation 
indicated that the operating costs of the damage system are about 
120 per cent of the net benefits that go to the injury victims them-
selves; the net amounts that the victims get are less than the total 
retained by insurance companies, law offices, and courts, Presumably, 
the cost ratio would be even higher in such states as New York and 
Illinois, where it appears that the legal expenses are substantially 
higher than in Michigan.46 
In contrast, private loss insurance systems (embracing principally 
life insurance and health insurance) showed average costs of about 
twenty-two per cent of net benefits.47 In some Blue Cross systems 
the operating costs drop to less than five per cent of the net benefits, 
and in Social Security programs they drop to about two per cent.48 
42. AACP 138 table 4-1 shows legal collection expenses to be 11.5 million dollars 
in personal injury accident cases in Michigan in 1958, and table 4-2, p. 139, shows total 
insured and uninsured tort liability reparation to be 46.7 million dollars for the same 
period; thus legal collection expenses were 24.6% of tort liability reparation. AACP 
190-92 discusses the cost of collection in serious injury cases; when some cost was in-
curred, the mean was thirty-two per cent of the total recovery. 
43. Billingsley 8:: Jorgenson, supra note 8; ILL. DEPT. OF Pun. WoRKS AND BLDGs., DIV. 
OF HIGHWAYS, op. cit supra note 8, at 95 table Cl-01.80-1; Jorgenson, supra note 8. 
AACP 138 table 4-1 shows total collection expenses to be about forty-six per cent of 
the total medical expenses: 11.5 million dollars total collection expenses and 25.1 mil-
lion dollars total medical expenses. 
44. Adams '55 at 55 table 34. 
45. See AACP 59 table 1-4, 61 fig. 1-1. 
46. Compare text at note 41 supra, with text at note 42 supra; see also note 43 supra. 
47. This figure is not the expense rate of any particular system, but an average of 
all systems. A sample of the variations included may be quickly gained by comparing 
the loss ratios shown in BES'I''S FIRE AND CASUALTY AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES. In 1961, 
stock companies reported aggregate loss ratios for individual hospital and medical in-
surance of 52.2%: for group accident and health of 82.9%: for workmen's compensa• 
tion of 64.3%. On the other hand, Blue Cross insurance in 1961 had an average operat-
ing cost ratio of about 7%. Reed 8:: Rice, Private Consumer Expenditures for Medical 
Care and Voluntary Health Insurance, 1948-62, Social Security Bulletin, Dec. 1963, 
pp. 3, 9 table 7. 
48. 2 HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF POPULATION, SERVICES, COSTS, 
METHODS OF PAYMENT, AND CONTROLS 1072 n. 1 (McNerney ed. 1962). Social Security 
Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1960, at pp. 6 table 7, 8-9 table 10, 8:: 21 table 
21. 
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The obvious lesson for those whose concern is the plight of the 
injury victims is that an increase in the generosity of tort damages 
is the most expensive way of bringing aid. Attention should be 
directed instead to the broadening of social security protection, 
group health insurance, and private loss insurance, in that order. 
This does not mean that the damage system is bad or useless. 
It does furnish compensation to injury victims. In fact, it furnishes 
more compensation than any of the other systems taken alone.49 
It also furnishes a way of forcing public attention to the needs of 
those injury victims for whom no more merciful avenue is provided. 
It also may serve to vindicate the innocent and admonish the guilty 
and to provide an incentive to persons involved in accidents to give 
the facts to the police. But these possible advantages should not be 
confused with providing reparation for injury losses, which can be 
done much more economically in a number of other ways. 
D. The Maldistribution of Benefits 
Another startling disclosure of the new studies is the capricious 
pattern of compensation for injury victims. About half of the serious 
injury victims are reimbursed less than half of their monetary loss,iso 
to say nothing of their psychic losses of pain and suffering, anxiety, 
humiliation, and bereavement. On the other hand, substantial per-
centages of victims receive two, three, four, or five times the amount 
of their economic losses.is1 
It would be logical, of course, that a substantial fraction of in-
jury victims would receive nothing at all because of the common-
law principle of contributory negligence. A rule of comparative 
negligence, if adopted, might explain why hardly anyone gets his 
full losses repaid and why the records show reparation ranging 
from zero to one hundred per cent of the actual losses. The concept 
of compensation for pain and suffering would explain also why some 
claimants receive far more in dollar awards than the amount of 
their economic losses. 
But none of these theories would justify the distribution that 
exists, with the least significant losers regularly receiving the largest 
multiple of losses and the really tragic cases of permanent disability 
receiving the smallest fraction. Yet this pattern is quite conclusively 
shown in two independently conducted studies of the last decade. 
49, AACP 139 table 4-2; id, at 147 table 4-9; id. at 151 fig. 4-1. 
50. AACP 178-80. 
51. Morris & Paul, supra note 6, at 917 fig. 1. 
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The Pennsylvania study, starting at the bottom, presents compensa-
tion ratios on losses ranging in size from under one hundred dollars 
to over three thousand dollars. In the "under one hundred dollars" 
group, one out of three claimants obtained more than five times 
the money he had lost. The ratios fell steadily as the amounts of 
loss rose, until, in the over three thousand dollar group, no one re-
ceived over five times his loss.52 The Michigan study picks up the 
comparison with victims of losses under one thousand dollars in the 
smallest group, rising to losses over twenty-five thousand dollars in the 
largest significant group. Under one thousand dollars, thirty-two per 
cent obtained more than one and one-half times their economic 
loss; in the group with losses over twenty-five thousand dollars, only 
five per cent got such a high ratio.53 The same maldistribution was 
reported by the Columbia study for accidents in 1929, measuring 
damage compensation only.54 This whimsical pattern of compensa-
tion still prevailed in the 1950's, after social security, health insur-
ance, and other sources of help had been added to the reparation 
repertory. 
E. Insulation of the Tort-feasor 
A fifth conclusion impelled by recent research is that the in-
dividuals whose negligence causes accidents, or whose different con-
duct might have avoided them, pay an almost negligible share of 
the total reparation received by injury victims. Even defendants 
who had been sued did not know, in one-third of the cases, what 
disposition had been made of the case. Defendants whose cases were 
settled without the filing of an answer were ignorant of the out-
come sixty-four per cent of the time.M Presumably, the percentage 
of ignorance would be even higher among the ninety-five per cent 
of potential defendants who were not even sued. 
These facts nullify most of the underpinning of contemporary 
tort theory. Tort theorists are accustomed to justify the law on the 
ground that it makes the wrongdoer pay, or shifts the loss to the 
wrongdoer.56 These theories prove to be poetic fallacies. The losses 
are not shifted to wrongdoers, but to right-doers: the conscientious 
drivers who buy liability insurance. 
These five lessons are not the only results of the new studies. 
52. Ibid. 
53. AACP 179 fig. 5-13. 
54. THE COLUMBIA REPORT 62. 
55. AACP 297 table 8-17. 
56. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948). 
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But they are enough to present the broad outline of the human 
problem that is to be treated. They also provide strong indications 
that the problem is not likely to be solved within the confines of the 
tort system, or even within the confines of all the existing systems. 
The time has come to lay the existing systems to one side, to look at 
the human needs that are to be met, and to design, on a clean sheet 
of paper, the remedies that are needed. 
III. NEW PRESCRIPTIONS FOR ECONOMIC TREATMENT 
The disclosures of recent research open the door to a fresh look 
at reparation for automobile injuries. Reparation can now be viewed 
as one of the processes of the social metabolism and examined for 
evidence of hyper- or hypo-activity and for benign or malignant 
effects. This view is made possible by new knowledge of the volume, 
the speed, and the direction of the reparation flow. 
In the following pages I should like to experiment with this 
new approach. I will not pause to evaluate the important contri-
butions to thought made by previous proposals. Like anyone else 
who thinks about this problem area, I am tremendously indebted 
to the Committee To Study Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents, whose Report has commanded the attention of legal writers 
and thinkers for three decades. I am indebted to the many who kept 
the subject alive in the ensuing decades,57 a Duke (now Harvard) 
professor named David F. Cavers,158 a Cincinnati judge named Robert 
S. Marx,159 a Yale professor named Fleming James,60 a New York 
justice named Samuel Hofstadter.61 I am grateful for the insights of 
Albert Ehrenzweig,62 Leon Green,63 Ame Fougner,64 Clarence Mor-
57. Most recently, Marshall, The Unreality of Accident Litigation: A Plea for a 
New Approach, 50 A.B.A.J. 713 (1964). 
58. Symposium-Financial Protection for the Motor Accident Victim, 3 LAw &: 
CoNTEMP. PRon. 465 (1936). This symposium contains several articles of current interest: 
one on the uncompensated accident victim by Emma Corstvet, who made the im-
portant Connecticut Case Studies that were printed as an appendix in THE COLUMBIA 
REPORT; one on the changing rules of automobile liability by Richard M. Nixon, later 
vice-president of the United States; and one article on each side of the debate over an 
automobile compensation plan, with Shippen Lewis taking the affirmative and P. Te-
cumseh Sherman the negative. 
59. Marx, Compensation Insurance for Automobile Accident Victims: The Case for 
Compulsory Automobile Compensation Insurance, 15 Omo ST. L.J. 134 (1954). 
60. James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents: An 
Unanswered Challenge, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 408 (1959). 
61. Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal to the Compensation Plan, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 
59 (1956). 
62. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1954). 
63. GREEN, TRAFFIC VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958). 
64. Mr. Fougner, president of the Christiana General Insurance Company of New 
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ris and James Paul65 and others who have offered fresh solutions to 
the problem. I am fortunate to have seen papers by Professors 
Keeton and O'Connell,66 and by Kalven and Blum,67 which have 
brilliantly summarized and analyzed the results of three decades 
of discussion of the Columbia compensation plan and its rivals. 
Rather than to add a surrebutter to the arguments so masterfully 
advanced, or even to color their classic disputations with the hues 
of new evidence, I should like to make a new start from the social 
situation. I propose to state what are the emergent needs discernible 
in the social situation and the most likely ways, among society's 
many loss-spreading devices, to remedy the ills. If this search leads 
me back to tort law and compensation plans, I will not resist; if it 
leaves the classic arguments untouched, I make no apology. 
While I hope to take my inspiration from the findings of recent 
research, I acknowledge that prescription of legal measures can 
never be the product of purely scientific observation. Prescription 
requires a large number of personal judgments of what things are 
desirable and which things are more desirable. The prescriptions 
that are proposed in the following pages for the reparation of 
automobile injuries are not compelled by the findings of research; 
they are the writer's personal opinions, formulated in the light of 
research findings. The same findings may lead other researchers to 
radically different conclusions. 
A. Rehabilitation 
The most important service that economic treatment can perform 
is to assure the accessibility of medical treatment. Wounds should be 
healed, bones set, prostheses supplied, psychic readjustment achieved, 
and occupational retraining provided when needed. 
These things should be done, it seems to me, for every victim, 
regardless of whether or not the victim was himself careless, whether 
or not the guilty driver can be found, and whether or not he can 
pay or has purchased adequate insurance. Medical services should 
York, has made several proposals in unpublished speeches to insurance and bar as• 
sociations. A popular presentation of some of his ideas appears in Fougner Sc Rankin, 
For Auto-Accident Victims-A New Kind of Insurance, Readers Digest, May 1961, p. 
107. 
65. Note 6 supra. 
66. Keeton and O'Connell plan an article to be called "Basic Protection for the 
Traffic Victim," or some similar title, to be published in the Harvard Law Review for 
December 1964 and a book to be published by Little, Brown & Co. in 1965. 
67. Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem-Auto 
Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641 (1964). 
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be supplied for humanitarian reasons-because the modern con-
science demands that no one unnecessarily be left physically im-
paired. They should also be supplied for economic reasons-because 
everyone loses when a member of society ceases to contribute to the 
national product and becomes instead a burden on the shoulders of 
others. 
Fortunately, the need for medical treatment is being met very 
well in the minor injury cases, which constitute the great majority 
of cases. Probably the most important source is the victim's own 
resources and those of his immediate family. This source has not 
been measured by any study. After the victim's own family resources, 
the next most important source is health insurance, now covering in 
some measure seventy per cent of Americans.68 Tort law does not seem 
to play a large role in paying medical bills, although it obviously tends 
to restore the personal resources that have been applied, and the 
prospect of getting damages may encourage private expenditure for 
medical treatment. A considerable number of injury victims re-
ceive "free" medical or hospital care, and a great many receive 
heavily subsidized care from public and private hospitals. There are 
also cases in which large medicals bills are paid by charities.69 
The Michigan survey asked how often necessary medical care 
was lacking. No cases were found in which emergency care or treat-
ment of acute conditions failed for financial reasons, although the 
care given was "unsatisfactory" in about fourteen per cent of the 
cases.70 On the other hand, a small but significant group failed for 
financial reasons to receive rehabilitative care-resetting of bones, 
cosmetic surgery, retraining in the use of muscles, and occupational 
retraining. This type of failure appeared in only one to two per 
cent of the serious injury cases, which translates into one to two 
hundred cases a year in Michigan. 
It is easy to see why rehabilitative treatment is frequently 
missed. It is "elective" treatment in the sense that no acute suffer-
ing drives the patient inevitably toward it. It is most frequently 
needed in very severe cases, in which months of unemployment and 
medical bills have exhausted the patient's own resources, his own 
medical insurance, and the damage settlement, if any. Damage 
settlements are commonly restricted by insurance limits and legal 
expenses to less than ten thousand dollars-an amount that is con-
68. AACP 42 table l·l. 
69. See AACP 170-75. 
70. AACP 77-81. 
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sumed by less than a year of hospitalization. Furthermore, such 
treatment is usually beyond the capacity of local doctors and hos-
pitals. If the patient knows at all about the possibility of such treat-
ment, he is confronted by the difficult choice of committing his last 
resources of cash and property, if any, in order to submit himself 
to further painful treatments for what must appear to be a dubious 
result. 
I submit that these omissions demand correction. Since they are 
few in number, the maximum restoration of these individuals could 
be paid for at a cost to all motorists that would hardly be noticed, 
and the state itself would benefit by doing so.71 
How should the omissions of rehabilitative treatment be sup-
plied? The first requirement of an appropriate regime is that it 
must miss no one. It cannot depend upon whether the accident is 
due to the "fault" of some ascertained person, nor upon whether 
insurance limits are high enough, nor upon whether the guilty 
driver can be found, nor upon whether the injury victim is suffi-
ciently litigious to bring a lawsuit or persuasive enough to make a 
good witness.72 Furthermore, it should be done by a system that is 
totally divorced from payment of cash benefits. The patient must 
not have the choice of spending his rehabilitation money for a new 
house instead. Least of all should rehabilitation efforts be permitted 
to use up money that the patient may need for subsistence.78 
These considerations rule out any system based upon individual 
71. It costs as much to support a disabled worker and his family for a year on relief 
as to rehabilitate the worker so that he can become self-supporting. NATIONAL INSTI• 
TUTE ON REHABILITATION AND WorutMEN'S COMPENSATION, REHABILITATING THE DIS• 
ABLED WORKER: A PLATFORM FOR ACTION 122 (Berkowitz ed. 1963). 
The case for rehabilitation has also been supported by the speeches and writings of 
Ame Fougner. See note 65 supra. 
72. Uninsured motorist insurance, unsatisfied judgment funds, and the New York 
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification plan all depend on someone being "liable" 
for the accident. For a discussion of these and other gap closing devices, see Keeton 8: 
O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim, section on "Closing the Gap in 
Financial Responsibility" [To be published]. Adams '60 at pp. 49.54 compares the cost 
of a Massachusetts type compulsory liability plan, a compensation scheme similar to a 
workmen's compensation program, and the present New Jersey system: voluntary insur-
ance both for loss and liability, a financial responsibility statute, and an unsatisfied 
judgments fund. See also Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: California's Latest 
Answer to the Problem of the Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 
516 (1960). 
73. Berkowitz, op. cit. supra note 71, at 45-58; SOMERS &: SOMERS, WorutMEN's COIII· 
PENSATION 259-60 (1954); Cheit, Summary Statement, Occupational Disability Study, in 
REsEARCH CONFERENCE ON "WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 
90-97 ijaffe ed. 1961); Leonard, Legal Roadblocks to Rehabilitation, 1963 PROC. SEC. 
OF INS. NEG. &: COMP, LAW ABA 229. 
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liability or private insurance. If the right to rehabilitation depends 
upon finding the person "liable," even though negligence is re-
moved, there will be cases where the victim goes uncompensated 
because liable persons cannot be found or are uninsured. Private 
loss insurance is also not the answer, because there is no practicable 
way to make every potential accident victim buy insurance.74 
An effective rehabilitation program requires a public fund that 
will supply the needed services without regard to whether the person 
who caused the loss is liable or can be found, or whether insurance 
was purchased by an appropriate person, or whether the cost of the 
benefits exceeds contractual limits. The important questions are how 
such a fund can be raised and how it should be disbursed. 
The disbursement question will be considered first. There are 
two possibilities. One is a state rehabilitation office. Every state has 
an appropriate public agency, although most of them are inade-
quately :financed and seem to be primarily oriented toward work-
related injuries,715 although these are probably less serious than auto-
mobile injuries.76 The other possibility is a nonprofit association of 
hospitals, which exists in nearly every state in the form of a Blue 
Cross agency.77 At their best, these agencies are almost as economical 
as public agencies-perhaps more so, when the hidden costs of public 
agencies are considered.78 
The second question-how the money should be raised-is truly 
74. A plan under development in Massachusetts would change the law from com• 
pulsory automobile liability insurance to compulsory health and accident insurance to 
cover the entire family of an automobile owner at all times, and any other people who 
might be injured in an accident involving his vehicle. Keeton &: O'Connell, op. cit • 
.supra note 72. 
75. The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1920 was entitled "An act to provide 
for the promotion of vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry or other-
wise and their return to civil employment." 41 Stat. 735 (1920). The most recent gen-
eral amendments are the Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments of 1954, 68 Stat. 
652, 29 U.S.C. §§ 21-42 (1958). There are no specific words disqualifying other injury 
victims, but the act and the amendments certainly were meant to be primarily for the 
benefit of workmen injured in their employment. 
76. Recent statistics indicate that the total number of reported personal injuries is 
greater from work accidents than from automobile accidents, but that the number of 
fatalities is substantially higher for automobile accidents. NATIONAL SAFETY CouNcIL, 
ACCIDENT FACTS (1963 ed.). If fatal automobile injuries are more frequent than fatal 
work injuries, it is probable that disabling injuries are also more frequent. The larger 
total number of work accidents presumably indicates either that the proportion of 
minor injuries is larger in work accidents or (more likely) that the reporting of injuries 
is more thorough in work accidents. 
77. 2 McNERNEY, op. cit. supra note 48, at 1072. 
78. Id. at 1072 n.1 lists the retention of Michigan Hospital Service (Blue Cross) as 
less than four per cent. 
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a secondary question, because the program is one that should be 
carried out no matter how the money is raised. If it had to be taken 
from general tax revenues, the program would still be worth under-
taking. However, a better system would be to place a substantial 
part of the cost on motorists, through a tax on automobile sales, 
automobile registrations, gasoline and tire sales, or driver license 
registrations. The choice among these alternatives presents problems 
that are common to other reparation programs; they will be analyzed 
on a later page. 
A program of this sort should not be confused with the contro-
versial programs of socialized medicine for all or for the aged. The 
common criticisms of socialized medicine would have very little 
applicability to a rehabilitation program tied to automobile in-
juries. Since rehabilitation services are seldom purchased by individ-
uals from their own funds, there would be very little sacrifice of 
any free choice. Since the injury must be shown to be automobile-
caused, there are important checks on imaginary or chronic ailments. 
Since rehabilitation requires specialized services, rarely if ever ren-
dered by family doctors, there would be no destruction of a tradi-
tional doctor-patient relationship; in fact, family doctors would be 
relied upon to refer rehabilitation patients to the proper clinics. 
The only plausible argument that can be made against a program 
of rehabilitation for automobile victims is that such a program is 
equally necessary for victims of all other accidents. It may be true 
that such a broad program will eventually be found to be desirable, 
but there are excellent reasons for trying such a program first in the 
limited area of automobile accidents. One reason is that the volume 
of automobile litigation shows that there is a sense that justice de-
mands reparation to an exent that does not exist with regard to 
kitchen accidents or boating accidents. Another reason is that de-
mands for automobile injury reparation are crowding the courts and 
distorting the practice of law, so that some effort should be made to 
siphon off the demand for reparation. A third reason is that auto-
mobile accidents are unlikely to be imagined or fabricated, because 
they normally occur in public places and are subject to a system of 
police reporting. A fourth reason is that enough is known about 
automobile accidents so that their frequency can be predicted and 
costs of a program estimated. Finally, there is a good possibility of 
paying for rehabilitation of automobile victims by some sort of tax 
on automobiles, which are already registered and serialized and, 
therefore, amenable to taxation. 
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B. Subsistence 
The second most important service that needs to be performed 
for injury victims is the provision of subsistence. A totally disabling 
injury, whether permanent or temporary, suddenly plunges a wage 
earner and his family into poverty. A permanently and totally dis-
abling injury plunges even a non-wage earner, such as a child, into 
a lifetime of hopeless dependence, ending in pauperism if and when 
his parents are no longer able to provide support. 
A great deal has already been done in the way of providing bare 
subsistence. For the family of a fatally injured wage earner who had 
about ten years of employment behind him, subsistence is now 
generally provided through the OASDI program.79 It is also availa-
ble for the totally and permanently disabled victim who has a similar 
earnings record, starting six months after the injury or after such 
longer period as is required to establish the permanence and totality 
of the injury.80 But, there are important gaps in this program. The 
most glaring is that of the disabled young person-a child, a student, 
or a young workman-who has not yet worked his way into the 
charmed circle of the "fully insured" under social security.81 Even 
if he is "fully insured," but has fewer than twenty quarters of 
coverage out of the last forty quarters, there are no disability bene-
fits. 82 And, even for the fully covered disability victim, there is an 
agonizing waiting period of many months before his disability is 
determined to be "total and permanent." His medical bills are 
tremendous, and his family still must eat and find shelter from the 
elements. It is the desperate need during this period that often leads 
injury victims to accept damage settlements of derisory amounts or 
leads their lawyers to loan them money to avoid the necessity for 
such settlements. The death of a young person with dependents 
also may impose severe deprivation. If he was not "fully covered" 
by forty quarters of earnings, survivors' benefits may be severely 
reduced. 
It seems to me that these victims and their families merit the 
same level of subsistence that has been established by the social 
security system and that seems to have missed these individuals 
only because of the lack of a financial basis for the program. I sug-
79. 74 Stat. 946 (1960). 
80. 72 Stat. 1020 (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)3 (Supp. V, 1964). 
81. See note 31 supra. 
82. 70 Stat. 815 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)l (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)l 
(Supp. V, 1964). 
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gest that there is a suitable tax basis-the automobile-which should 
be called upon to relieve this area of distress. For the dependents of 
wage earners, payments should begin after about a week or two, as 
in the case of workmen's compensation or unemployment compensa-
tion.83 For minors, who were presumably dependent on their 
parents at the time the injury was incurred, that dependency might 
be allowed to continue until the age of twenty-one, after which it 
would be fair to provide the disability victim with the means of 
minimum subsistence. 
Obviously, the tort system is unsuited to supplying this kind of 
assistance. It is geared to distinguish percipiently between the guilty 
and the innocent and to measure the highly individualized losses, 
both economic and psychic, of each claimant. Its expensive para-
phernalia should not be wasted on a program that makes no such 
discriminations. The subsistence program should operate with a 
minimum of rules, distinctions, and administrative personnel. The 
disbursing agency should be the same agency that already dispenses 
this kind of aid-the Social Security Administration. 
Like other subsistence programs-unemployment insurance and 
OASDI-automobile accident benefits should be financed by a 
specific tax, but not by an increase in the tax on payrolls. The 
funds should come from taxes on motorists, just as for the rehabili-
tation program. The various forms that such a tax might take will 
be discussed later in this article. 
C. The Maintenance of Basic Income 
Subsistence at social security levels is better than destitution, 
but it is still at the boundary line of "poverty"-a domain that im-
poses disadvantages of health, education, and opportunity on those 
who are within it. Obviously, everyone would be pleased if the 
universal standard of living could be higher than this; that is the 
goal of the "war on poverty." The question.is whether there is any 
basis for a local battle against the poverty of automobile injury 
victims-in other words, whether there is a need for a program for 
the maintenance of income at a modest level of health and decency 
that is somewhere above the level of social security subsistence.84 
83. Waiting periods permit minor losses to be covered from the most 'efficient of all 
sources-the injury victim's own resources. Compare SOMERS &: SOMERS, op. cit. supra 
note 73, at 55. 
84. The maximum benefit that a family can reap from social security on the basis 
of a single member's contribution is 254 dollars per month (3,048 dollars per year). 
The maximum that one individual can reap has recently been extended from $127 per 
month to $133 per month ($1,596 per year). 72 Stat. 1013 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) 
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The problem is not an easy one. Presumably no one will advo-
cate improving the lot of the injury victim so much that he is better 
off than before he was injured. Therefore, people who live at the 
subsistence level before they are injured must continue to live at 
that level afterward. But, for those whose family income before 
injury was something above three thousand dollars, there are ob-
vious objectives in income protection beyond the level provided by 
social security. One might aim, for instance, to maintain the income 
of the former six thousand dollar a year family at 3,600 dollars, and 
of the former twelve thousand dollar a year family at six thousand 
dollars. One may justify this on the humanitarian side by recog-
nizing that the demoralizing effect of a su,!:>sistence income of three 
thousand dollars must be very different for a family that is accus-
tomed to several times that much, than for those who have always 
lived at that income level.85 On the utilitarian side, one must recog-
nize that a program in which benefits are related to former earning 
levels is a way of reinforcing the free enterprise system; it is not 
an equalization of wealth, but rather is an extension of the rewards 
of achievement. 
One can hardly be satisfied with the existing devices that attempt 
to protect the injury victim and his dependents from a catastrophic 
plunge into poverty. One of these is the tort system, which provides 
rather alluring lump sums to those who are injured, without con-
tributory negligence, by drivers who can be identified, who are 
demonstrably negligent, and who carry liability insurance. Un-
fortunately, about half the injury victims fall into the gaps of this 
system instead of hitting the bases. Those who hit the bases must 
hold out doggedly against cheap settlements. The alluring sums are 
generally limited to the ten thousand dollar insurance limit less col-
lection expenses, so that the net is utterly inadequate to make a 
significant income supplement over a lifetime. Since most injury 
(1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. V, 1964). The Social Security Bulletin, 
Aug. 1963, p. 2 reported that in April of 1963 the average disability benefit award to 
disabled workers reached an all-time high of $90.20 for the month or, if extended to a 
full year, $1,080. This should be compared with the three thousand dollars per year 
income for an urban family of four that the President's Council of Economic Advisors 
describes as the breaking point between poverty and minimum maintenance. N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 21, 1964, p. 17, col. 4. 
85. While writing generally on poverty in the United States, Michael Harrington 
discusses an urban family of four living on 6,147 dollars per year. He concludes, "Clear-
ly, this is not a budget for the gracious living depicted by the American magazines. 
It is not, in contemporary terms, poverty or anything like it. But such a family would 
face a serious crisis in the event of a protracted illness or long-term unemployment for 
the family head.'' HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 181 (1962). 
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victims do not enjoy investment advisory services, it is miraculous if 
the lump sum is invested so as to return any income at all a few years 
after the accident. 
Another income supplement comes from sick leave pay and 
group disability insurance provided by employers for their entire 
group of employees.86 The growth of these programs is heartening, 
but nearly all cover relatively short terms, ranging from a few 
months to two years. 
Many people carry individual insurance against disability. This 
seems like an excellent solution, since it permits each wage earner 
to determine his own income protection needs. However, it appeals 
to relatively few custome:i.;s and has a high operating expense rate.87 
These considerations in favor of an income maintenance plan 
are reinforced by reflection on a half-century of experience with 
workmen's compensation, which is supported by the $ame basic 
considerations. Although workmen's compensation is widely criti-
cized, no one proposes to do away with its program of income re-
placement benefits based upon a scale related to prior earnings. One 
might also reflect upon the program of unemployment insurance, 
which aims to supply income on a graded scale to those who have 
been deprived of it. 
The mystery is not why there should be a basic income main-
tenance program for automobile injury victims, but why it has been 
delayed so long. Workmen's compensation probably gained many 
votes 'because of the illusion that it would make the employers pay, 
although sophisticated observers generally recognized that costs 
would be passed on to consumers.88 Automobile compensation has 
no such political leverage because it visibly burdens all automobile 
owners, who are nearly as numerous and often the same as the per-
sons who might be benefited. What is more, it destroys the illusion 
of the tort system, which purports to place losses on the "negligent," 
86. In 1960, about 21 million persons had group income loss protection. SOURCE 
BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, 1962, at 21. The aggregate loss ratio for stock com-
pany individual accident insurance for 1961 was reported at 43.1 %, which may be 
translated to a ratio of operating expenses to benefits paid of 132%, BESr's FIRE AND 
CAsuALTY AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES 125 (1961). See also Skolnik, Income-Loss Protection 
Against Short-Term Sickness, 1948-62, Social Security Bulletin, Jan. 1964, p. 9. 
87. Like private health and accident insurance, however, private insurance against 
income loss is growing in importance. Id. at IO. 
88. The cost of industrial accidents is "a legitimate cost of production." SOMERS &: 
So:MERS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 27. The authors ascribe the following phrase to Lloyd 
George: "The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workingman." Id. at 
28 n. 16. 
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although the bill is really paid by the mass of conscientious auto-
moblie owners who pay insurance premiums. 
A second factor that has inhibited development of an income 
maintenance program for automobile victims is the doctrinaire posi-
tion adhered to by proponents of automobile compensation plans 
that they must displace tort law.89 This position is a result of 
slavishly copying the historical compromises of workmen's com-
pensation, which resulted from the impotent position of workmen 
under common law.90 The automobile injury claimant has no need 
to make so poor a bargain. Moreover, this form of proposal solidi-
fies the opposition of the whole phalanx of general practitioners 
and claimants' lawyers who are the injury victims' natural allies. 
What is proposed here is a basic income maintenance plan for 
wage earners, which would have only incidental effects on tort law. 
Overwhelming considerations of economic utility point toward it. 
The only question is how it can be most effectively implemented. 
Broadening the tort law regime would not be an efficient way of 
providing income replacement. Because tort law is slow, it misses 
the months when income is most needed. Because it pays in a lump 
sum, it affords no guarantee of continued support. Because it is ex-
pensive to operate, it needlessly doubles the burdens of those who 
must pay the bill. 
The social security regime also seems unfitted to do the job of 
income replacement above poverty levels. Although social security 
programs in other countries manage to award varying pensions 
according to the preceding pay rate, the American system is attached 
to a virtually level benefit rate, subject only to deduction for inade-
quate years of coverage or an insufficient wage base. To introduce 
a system of graded benefits into the social security system would be 
to create formidable administrative and political complications. 
Two general types of systems can be envisaged that would effi-
ciently fill the need for basic income maintenance above the sub-
sistence level. The best from a schematic viewpoint would be a 
single fund to which all drivers or owners would contribute taxes 
assessed at rates based upon the varying accident frequencies of 
various classes among them. This system would have the advantage 
of eliminating the expensive search for the particular automobile 
or combination of automobiles that caused the damage. It would 
also eliminate the needless expense of selling individual policies to 
89. E.g., THE COLUMBIA REPORT 132; EHRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 63, at 20. 
90. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-52 (1936). 
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individual owners and the competition of insurance companies for 
the patronage of each automobile driver. The fund could be 
operated by a government corporation or by a franchised private 
monopoly in which all insurance companies would be permitted to 
participate; in either case, it would eliminate the complexity that 
results from regulating a multiplicity of dissimilar companies and 
compelling each to accept its proportionate share of undesirable 
risks. 
But there are strong arguments against the monopoly system. 
Since tort liability insurance will continue to exist, the monopoly 
system would create a perpetual rivalry between the competitive 
and the monopoly insurance sectors. It would bring a host of eco-
nomic issues and management problems into the realm of politics 
and remove them from the forces of the market place. The choice is 
closely parallel to the classic conflict between "state fund" and 
"private insurance" systems of workmen's compensation. Since both 
systems are now functioning effectively in workmen's compensation 
programs of various states, probably either system could effectively 
maintain basic income for automobile injury victims.91 
Benefits under a basic income maintenance regime should be 
limited to some fraction of the lost wage and should be subject to a 
ceiling that would not be higher than the national average wage.92 
91. Dodd reviews the advantages claimed for state funds, private stock companies, 
and private mutual companies. Id. at 532-37. He concludes, "In reviewing the advan-
tages claimed by each type of insurance system a striking similarity is noticeable. Each 
class of carrier alleges that it offers sounder security and a higher grade of service than 
the others, and, if it cannot lay claim to lower cost, the contention is advanced that the 
services rendered policy-holders are worth the higher premium." Id. at 537. 
92. The states have set different percentages of the injured workman's wage as the 
maximum that he may receive. In addition, each state has set a maximum number of 
weeks during which one may receive this benefit, or a maximum number of dollars 
that he may collect, or, often, both. A chart of the states and their provisions in this 
respect appears in SOMERS & SOMERS, op. cit. supra note 73, at table III-B. Some writers 
have stated that one cannot give the beneficiary 100% of the injured man's previous 
wage because this would foster malingering among the partially or temporarily dis-
abled. As the authors point out, however, the dead and the permanent-totally disabled 
do not malinger, and it is in their cases that the absolute maximums have the most 
pronounced effect. Id. at 83. The authors also make this interesting comment on the 
relationship between the percentages and the absolute maximums: "If it is claimed 
,that a percentage of wages should form the basis of compensation, such percentages 
themselves represent maximums. The additional maximums not only create inequalities 
of treatment but, because legislatures cannot be expected regularly to relegislate the 
absolute amounts to keep up with shifts in wage levels, they also vitiate the original 
claims of the law. 
"Americans generally take pride that our social security systems attempt to take 
account of the varying wage levels of beneficiaries as distinguished from the flat-sum 
benefits in England. In actuality, the workmen's compensation laws are approaching a 
flat-sum system, at a low level, and doing it with complex formulas. There appears to 
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The fractional character is important because of the moral dangers 
of making invalidism as attractive as working.93 The prin~iple of 
full reparation is appropriately reserved, as under tort law, to bene-
ficiaries who can prove themselves completely innocent of contrib-
utory fault. The ceiling is important for more subtle reasons. On 
the plane of economic theory, one may believe that the social gain 
in raising a man's income from five thousand dollars to 7,500 dollars 
is less than in raising it from 2,500 dollars to five thousand dollars.94 
On the plane of political reality, one may be sure that the public 
will never support a compulsory program for maintaining invalids 
at a higher income level than the average worker earns. 
It is true that fractional benefit rates and the benefit ceilings 
have been a subject of bitter animadversion in the law of workmen's 
compensation.95 But, the curse would be mitigated in the proposed 
automobile system because a tort action for uncompensated losses 
will remain available to the deserving. 
D. Other Losses: Property Damage and Psychic Harm 
If new programs of reparation to supply rehabilitation, sub-
sistence, and income replacement were adopted, other losses of 
considerable magnitude would still remain to be considered. Among 
the most prominent of these are property damage ( chiefly to auto-
mobiles) and psychic losses. 
Damage to an automobile, unlike disabling injury or death to 
an individual, does not seem to call for any new measures in aid of 
injury victims. Automobiles are generally insured much more ade-
quately than life and limb, partly because of the beneficent insist-
ence of finance companies.96 There is usually a deductible amount, 
be no justification in equity or in the theory of workmen's compensation for imposing 
maximums upon maximums." Id. at 82. 
93. Cf. Resolution of the Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law 
of the American Bar Association, 1962 PROC. SEC. OF INS. NEG. AND COMP. LAw, ABA 
392, 393 (1962). 
94. The theory of "diminishing utility" of money is discussed in many economic 
texts; it is reviewed in relation to automobile injuries in AACP 110-15. 
95. "Virtually all students of the subject are in agreement as to the inadequacy of 
present cash benefits to meet the needs of the families affected." SOMERS 8: SOMERS, op. 
cit. supra note 73, at 82. 
"The present scale of benefits provided for disabled workers and their dependents 
does not reach even a subsistence level under present living costs." U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Standards Bull., No. 85, 1946, p. 21. 
"Almost all compensation payments are inadequate by present-day standards •••• " 
2 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE HEALTii NEEDS OF THE NATION, BUILDING AMER-
ICA'S HEALTH 77 (1953). 
96. See Adams '60, at 19. 
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but this is precisely because most automobile owners find it cheaper 
to pay their own bills than to employ a corporation to pay on their 
behalf; to install a full compensation plan would result in doing 
expensively what is now done cheaply. 
Little distress is created by the automobiles not covered by colli-
sion insurance. People with cars of small value are likely 'to omit 
collision insurance because they can afford to replace their cars 
more easily than to insure them. Any compensation system applied 
to such cases would be a useless burden. 
There remain a few real or imaginary cases in which a man's car 
is demolished, he lacks the means to replace it, and the absence of 
a car imposes severe hardship. In one case discovered in the Michi-
gan survey, a salesman who needed a new car accepted a ridiculously 
low settlement for his wife's back injury because he needed money 
to replace his car, which had been wrecked in her accident. One 
wonders if other means of raising a down payment-such as a per-
sonal loan-could not have been found; but, in any event, the 
deprivation in this case did not last long. If a family were too poor 
to finance a new car, they would probably be too poor to own it 
after purchase. The problem, then, is lack of income maintenance, 
rather than lack of reparation for the automobile. The loss of a 
car can impose severe hardship on a poor man and his family, but 
it is not a type of hardship that seems to call for society to intervene 
beyond the limits of tort law. 
Pain, suffering, humiliation, and bereavement are also unsuit-
able subjects for a compensation plan. If they are so severe as to 
cause disability, the disability should be compensated as in other 
cases and for the same reasons. But it is doubtful that health and 
productivity-with which all of society is concerned-are substan-
tially promoted by making other innocent members of society com-
pensate the psychic sufferers. In addition, psychic losses do not lend 
themselves to any known regime of standardized treatment. No 
system has been proposed that could measure them otherwise than 
by the guess of twelve laymen. Thus, as is the case with property 
damage, psychic losses are properly left to the mercies of tort 
liability. 
IV. ADAPTATIONS OF THE TORT SYSTEM 
Nothing that has been disclosed by recent factual research or the 
experience of foreign countries has indicated that the tort system of 
reparation for automobile injuries should be abolished. To be sure, 
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it has been shown to be inadequate; that is a reason for supplement-
ing it, not for abolishing it. It has been shown to be expensive; that 
is a good reason for shifting to other regimes the things that they 
can do better. But there remain many tasks that the tort system alone 
can perform. These include, in appropriate cases, the restoration of 
earnings above the minimal level that a universal insurance system 
will support, the reparation of property loss and psychic loss, the 
vindication of the innocent, and the punishment or admonition of 
the guilty. The tort system should be preserved and considerably 
amended to achieve these purposes. 
It should be preserved also because it supplies a powerful in-
centive to keep the other systems working. Since it has no arbitrary 
ceilings, it provides a constant incentive to keep earnings restoration 
at reasonable levels; it is a safeguard against the obsolescent levels of 
compensation that have persisted in many workmen's compensation 
regimes.07 Through the jury, it brings the popular conscience to bear 
in deciding when and how much reparation should be given. It is the 
tort system that has forced upon public consciousness the inad-
equacies of present reparation for automobile injuries and the ab-
sence of it in industrial injuries that has permitted that system to 
stagnate. 
The major charge that has been leveled against the tort system 
in this paper and elsewhere is that it is ~ inefficient loss-spreading 
device. This is true. But it is a charge that will lose force when some 
of the functions of loss shifting have been cared for by more appro-
priate means. If new systems of rehabilitation, of subsistence, and of 
basic wage maintenance are introduced, the tort system will 
be miraculously cured of most of its ailments. Appellate judges will 
no longer find it necessary to distort principles of fault in order to 
provide social justice for injury victims. Juries will no longer feel 
so irresistibly the impulse to disregard instructions in order to help 
the impoverished. Injury victims will be less likely to accept derisory 
settlements because they need money so urgently. Delay of trial will 
no longer be so powerful a weapon in the hands of the defense. 
In addition, a tremendous simplification of the insurance scene 
will result from the provision of loss-redistribution devices outside 
the tort system. There will be much less need for compulsory liabil-
ity insurance, financial responsibility laws, or an unsatisfied judg-
ment fund. If liability insurance becomes less essential, there will be 
97. CHEIT, INJURY AND RECOVERY IN TIIE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 94-150 (1961); 
SOMERS &: SOMERS, op. cit. supra note 73, at 82-83. 
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better reasons for freeing premium rates for liability insurance from 
administrative regulation and leaving them to the forces of the 
market place. 
In short, the most glaring inadequacies of the tort system can be 
remedied without touching a line of tort law. Nevertheless, changes 
in tort law should be made, and some of them will become more ur-
gent as well as more feasible because an underpinning of loss-shifting 
through social insurance has been provided. Among the myriad im-
provements that should be adopted, considered, or studied, I will 
mention here only the ones that are most relevant to other proposed 
reforms and to the disclosures of recent research. 
A. Correlation of Benefit Programs 
An outstanding need of tort law today is for systematic correla-
tion with other benefit programs. Recent research shows that most 
injury victims receive reparation from more than one source and 
that the total received from non-tort sources is about equal to that 
from the tort source.98 Moreover, the non-tort sources have grown 
much more rapidly in the past thirty years than the tort sources, so 
that the need of correlation is a rapidly increasing one.99 
There are three possible approaches to the problems raised by 
parallel benefit systems. One is cumulation: awarding reparation 
under each of the parallel systems without regard to reparation re-
ceived under any of the others. A second is subrogation: permitting 
one regime to get reimbursement from another regime. A third is 
deduction: denying reparation under one regime because reparation 
has been received or can be obtained from another. 
For the most part, tort law follows the cumulation system. A per-
son who has received disability insurance benefits from a private 
insurance policy, or from the social security system, or from both 
has an undiminished right to obtain, in a tort action, payments for all 
his losses.100 This solution does not seem to be based upon a con-
viction that it is socially desirable for anyone to be thrice paid, but 
rather upon a policy of nonrecognition or refusal to face the prob-
lem. Its real origin is obviously historical; tort law was born and 
98. On the multitude of sources of reparation, see AACP 146 table 4·8, and the ac-
companying text. On the aggregates of the various sources, see AACP 147 table 4-9. 
99. See AACP 70 fig. 1-2, 71 fig. 1-3, 175-80. 
100. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22 (1956); McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 87, 90 
(1935). See Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1963), where the Court held that in a 
railroad worker's suit against the railroad for personal injury the trial court properly 
excluded evidence that the claimant was receiving $190 in pension benefits under the 
Railroad Retirement Act. 
December 1964] Automobile Injury Compensation 309 
brought up before other loss-shifting regimes existed to any signifi-
cant extent; judges seem to assume that if any accommodation is to 
be done, it is the responsibility of the newly arrived regimes, not of 
tort law. This attitude is suggested by the frequently used term "col-
lateral sources rule," under which it is assumed that the main thing 
is the tort law and that all other programs are "collateral."101 
Some obvious afterthoughts have been offered as justifications for 
the cumulation of benefits. It is sometimes said that the injury vic-
tim's luck or foresight in obtaining additional sources of reparation 
should not relieve the burden of the wrongdoer. This argument is 
quite irrelevant to most modern automobile accidents, since the 
damages aren't paid by vvrongdoers, but instead are paid by insur-
ance companies who collect their premiums from all the millions of 
automobile owners who buy insurance; it would have real relevance 
only in those very rare cases in which the negligent motorist pays 
damages from his own pocket. Even then, it would be strikingly in-
consistent with the whole process of damage assessment, which is 
based upon the amount of loss and not at all (except in the case of 
punitive damages) upon the amount necessary to punish or ad-
monish the wrongdoer. 
Another justification sometimes offered is that noncumulation 
would deprive the injury victim of the benefit of the loss insurance 
that he has "bought" by paying premiums or social security taxes. 
This argument assumes that the injury victim has chosen his in-
surance with the contemplation of getting it plus tort damages. Of 
course, the assumption is completely vacuous as far as concerns so-
cial security. Applied to purely private contractual insurance, the 
argument is somewhat unrealistic in assuming that the purchaser 
has anything in mind so remote as double payment. However, it 
does contain a germ of truth, in that private insurers could, if they 
wished, provide in their policies for subrogating themselves to the 
insured's right against third parties, and they seldom do so except in 
the case of health insurance and property insurance. 
The crucial question about cumulation is whether it is sound 
public policy. It certainly is not. Presumably, everyone would admit 
that there is at best a waste of resources in taking money from others 
to overpay for losses, except where damages are assessed by way of 
punishment. In the area of property insurance, the law has very 
IOI. I.e., collateral to the defendant. See 2 HARPER. &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22 (1956); 
James, Tort Law in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFFALO L. 
REv. 815, 835 (1959). 
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properly recognized that it is against public policy to permit anyone 
to overinsure.102 Although it is less likely that anyone will deliberate-
ly injure himself in order to get money than it is that he will delib-
erately injure his property for the same reason, there are two very 
real perils in overcompensation. One is the possible encouragement 
of a devil-may-care attitude toward one's own safety, which seems to 
be entirely too frequent among drivers. Another is the loss of public 
confidence in the reparation system that results from overcompensa-
tion. It probably builds up, on the one hand, a credo among claim-
ants that they are entitled to a little profit or compensation for the 
trouble of collecting compensation and, on the other hand, a cynical 
belief among claim agents and jurors that nearly everybody is get-
ting overpaid, so that there is no real need for the liability insurer 
to repay the entire loss.103 
It is unlikely that the cumulation of benefits rule would have en-
joyed the tolerance accorded it if the lawgivers understood how great 
are the possibilities of overpayment and how many sources of un-
correlated compensation are sometimes available. Recognition of 
the true situation will probably push the law in the direction of one 
of the noncumulative solutions-subrogation or deduction. 
Subrogation is the solution that tort law ordinarily applies to 
property loss situations. If an insurance company has insured an 
automobile owner against collision damage and has paid a damage 
bill, it is entitled to be repaid by any tort-feasor who is responsible 
for the damage. Recently, clauses have been inserted in health in-
surance policies that entitle hospital and medical insurers to similar 
reimbursement.104 The theory of subrogation rests upon the assump-
tions that losses should not be overpaid and that it is better for the 
costs to be borne by the guilty tort-feasors than by the innocent 
buyers of loss insurance. Both propositions are completely sound, 
and the practice of subrogation often leads to the best possible alloca-
tion of loss in property cases. 
If subrogation were frictionless, there would be a good deal to 
be said for the subrogation of insurers of life, disability, and health. 
102. For a discussion of this in relation to the present context, see 2 HARPER 8c 
JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1350-51 (1956). 
103. HUNTING 8c NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? 29, 41, 43, 88, 132 (1962), 
104. See Kimball &: Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L, 
REv. 841, 861-62 (1962). In their conclusions, the authors discuss the methods that might 
be used to extend subrogation, but they decline to comment on its advisability. Id. at 
869. See also HoRN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE (1964), a com-
prehensive review of subrogation problems which came to the author's attention after 
the present article was completed. 
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The heavily burdened Blue Cross system would be relieved of some 
of its expenses, which would be loaded onto liability insurance. 
Health insurance would cost less, and the price of automobile own-
ership would reflect more accurately the total costs that it occasions. 
But this advantage would be bought at a startling cost. Consider 
the case of a one thousand dollar hospital bill incurred by a Blue 
Cross policyholder. When his bill is paid by Blue Cross, the cost to 
all Blue Cross policyholders combined is about 1,080 dollars.105 As-
sume further that Blue Cross obtains reimbursement by virtue of 
subrogation from Drivers' Liability Company, which has insured the 
tort-feasor. Blue Cross will presumably pay at least twenty-five per 
cent in collection expenses and will net about 750 dollars out of the 
one thousand dollars paid by Drivers' Liability. But the policyhold-
ers of Drivers' Liability will have incurred corresponding premium 
costs of sixteen hundred dollars, since liability insurers work at an 
expense rate equivalent to about sixty per cent of payouts.106 The 
net effect of the subrogation is to make liability insurance policy-
holders pay sixteen hundred dollars in order to save 750 dollars for 
health insurance policyholders. Probably a large majority of the 
health insurance policyholders are also liability insurance policy-
holders, who have their costs doubled by subrogation without any 
increase of their benefits. The principal beneficiaries of the shift 
are insurance companies and lawyers. 
These rough calculations find interesting echoes in the experi-
ence of foreign countries. Professor Street reports that health insurers 
in Great Britain in a recent year found that collection expenses for 
one class of subrogation claims amounted to ninety per cent of the 
collections.107 In Sweden, subrogation of health insurance was aban-
105. In 1962, Blue Cross plans had operating costs of 5.7% of income. Blue Shield 
plans had I 1.0%. The total Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan operating cost as a percentage 
of income was 7.2%. This would amount to about 8% of payouts. Reed & Rice, Private 
Consumer Expenditures for Medical Care and Voluntary Health Insurance, 1948-62, 
Social Security Bulletin, Dec. 1963, p. 11 table 10. 
106. Compare payouts of 1.494 billion dollars with insurance expense of 926 mil• 
lion dollars. AACP 48, 54. Another source of similar ratios is BEST'S FIRE AND CASUALTY 
AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES. The 1961 edition shows automobile bodily injury losses as 
59.4% of premiums earned for stock companies, 60.2% for mutuals. Id., 1961, at 133, 
205. For a somewhat similar calculation of costs on subrogation of a health insurer, see 
HORN, op. cit supra, note 104, at 115-16. Horn indicates, however, that subrogation in 
property damage claims can be made quite economical. Id. at 130. 
107. To collect 82 thousand pounds in income the hospitals paid out 73 thousand 
pounds in collection expense. AACP 425. 
In addition, British insurers have widespread "knock for knock" agreements where• 
by neither company will sue the other for property damage to the automobile. Instead, 
each company pays its own insured under the comprehensive part of his policy. This 
reduces the total cost of automobile insurance by eliminating the expense of the un-
necessary step of the loss insurer suing the liability insurer. AACP 432-33. 
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doned on the ground that it was a mere shifting of expense from 
one of a man's pockets to the other.108 
Subrogation, then, is a solution that would have theoretical at-
tractions but that seems to involve incidental costs which outweigh 
its benefits. One must applaud the conclusion reached many years 
ago by Professor James, on a more intuitive analysis, that losses 
should be left with the first loss-distributing agency that incurs 
them and not reshifted to other loss-distributing agencies.100 
If subrogation is rejected, how is cumulation of benefits to be 
avoided? The alternative is deduction. Deduction should most ob-
viously be applied when an injury victim receives free or donated 
care. Suppose, for instance, a child is struck by an automobile and 
incurs a potentially crippling injury. After his health insurance is 
exhausted, treatments are continued at the charge of the Society for 
Crippled Children. After treatment is concluded, his claim against 
the tort-feasor comes to trial. Is he entitled to include in his tort 
claim the value of the medical treatment received at the expense of 
the Society? It has no claim to subrogation, since it paid for the 
services as a free gift. The law is in confusion, but there is some 
indication that the child is entitled to receive the fair value of the 
medical services he received.110 If this is the law, it should be 
changed. The expenses paid by a charitable agency should be de-
ducted or excluded from the amount otherwise recoverable. The 
same conclusion seems warranted with respect to the health insurance 
which, in the hypothetical case, paid for the child's initial emergency 
treatment and which is subject to either cumulation or subrogation 
under present law.111 It should be deducted from recoverable dam-
ages in the interests of minimizing the total cost to society. 
108. AACP 445-46. 
109. James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Distribu-
tion of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L. J. 360 (1958). See also 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS 
op. cit. supra note 102, § 25.23, at 1355. For a very competent defense of subrogation, 
see HORN, op. cit. supra, note 104. Most of Hom's arguments and statistics relate to 
property insurance, not personal insurance. 
110. See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 100, § 90, at 325. "The generalized standard 
of the 'value' of the necessary services rather than the theory of reimbursement for the 
specific outlay, offers a ready basis on which to justify recovery." 
Harper and James admit that the individual may recover the value of services ac-
tually paid for by a government agency, but they maintain that it ought not to be al-
lowed, arguing that the government does not mean to confer a bounty on the recipient, 
but merely to make certain that his needs are fulfilled; when the government has paid 
for these needs, the defendant need not. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1350 
(1956). Conversely, if the wrong-doer is to be punished by being made to pay, the gov-
ernment does not mean to relieve him of this duty by paying the plaintiff's expenses. 
111. See authorities cited in note 100 supra. 
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There is one weakness in this solution. It leads to the conceal-
ment of a part of the cost of automobile operation. It is not neces-
sarily important that every penny of the costs of automobile opera-
tion be shifted to motorists; but, if it should be done in this instance, 
there is a much cheaper device than subrogation. That is to impose a 
tax on motorists and use the proceeds to subsidize public health 
facilities. This can probably be done at an operating cost of under 
three per cent, instead of over 120 per cent.112 
The case for deduction of benefits is just as strong with respect 
to disability and survivorship benefits under the social security sys-
tem. Consider the case of a man who is totally and permanently dis-
abled; his former income was five thousand dollars a year; under 
OASDI it will be about 1,500 dollars.113 Should tort damages be as-
sessed at five thousand dollars a year or at 3,500 dollars? The latter 
figure is obviously the one that corresponds to the facts and to the 
theory that damages are to compensate loss, not to generate profit. 
In opposition to this obvious lesson, the argument will be made 
that, if damages are reduced, motorists will fail to pay the total costs 
of automobile operation. If this objective is desired, it can be done 
simply enough; an automobile tax can be imposed, with proceeds 
going to the OASDI investment fund. 
Private life insurance benefits present quite a different case and 
ordinarily should not be deducted from tort damages. A large frac-
tion of life insurance benefits is a return of savings, which could 
be cashed in or borrowed upon before death. This is no more 
appropriate for deduction than is a savings account. Another 
large part of life insurance benefits is not protection against loss, 
but gifts; they are the counterpart of old-fashioned legacies.114 There 
is no public policy against legacies, and the law should not seek to 
nullify contractual arrangements to confer them. But, even if life in-
surance were deductible in theory, there would be few cases for 
the deduction. The death cases are large loss cases, and evidence 
shows that most large economic losses are grossly underpaid, rather 
than overpaid. · 
There remain a few cases where over-compensation of large losses 
occurs, and one may speculate on whether the jury should be in-
112. See AACP 59 table 1-4, 61 fig. 1-1. 
113. 70 Stat. 815 (1956), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)2 (Supp. V, 1964); 72 Stat. 
1013 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1958), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (Supp. V, 1964). 
114. On the basis of an analogy between life insurance and a savings account or an 
annuity, Harper and James reach the conclusion that life insurance should not be de-
ducted. 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 25.22, at 1350-52 (1956). 
314 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 63:279 
formed of the life insurance benefits .and instructed to deduct them 
in proper cases. Probably everyone would concede the advantage of 
deducting flight insurance benefits from damages in suits against air-
line companies. In many cases where the evidence would fail to void 
the insurance contract, it would nevertheless show such lack of 
donative intent that the collection of cumulative tort damages 
should be denied. Although this type of problem has been best pub-
licized in airline cases, the Harvard Public Health studies have in-
dicated that it also exists in automotive murder or suicide.115 To let 
the jury deduct life insurance benefits would tend to reduce the 
moral risk inherent in compensation for death. 
A second reason for letting the jury consider life insurance 
benefits is more subtle. It involves a recognition that the jury does 
its job not only by following literally the instructions that the judge 
gives, but also by tempering the law with "fireside equity."116 But 
the jury's view of fireside equity is half-blinded if it is not told about 
the non-tort sources of reparation that are available to the accident 
victim's survivors. 
For these reasons, I advocate that life insurance benefits, like 
other benefits, should be deductible from tort damages when the 
jury finds that they represent an excess over policy reserve values 
and that the policies were not purchased with donative intent. The 
gross damages from which they would be deducted would include 
compensation for grief according to existing tort principles. The 
main objective is that the jury should make its decisions with full 
knowledge of dependents' insurance resources. 
B. Promoting Settlements 
Probably the most notorious of the evils of the tort system is 
the tremendous duration of cases, of which less than half are settled 
within a year and many not for two or three years.117 Although the 
human tragedy of delayed settlements will be greatly alleviated if 
the "new prescriptions" proposed in the preceding pages are adopted, 
there will still be powerful reasons for promoting early settlements. 
Deprivation in 1964 can not be erased by surplus in 1967. The 
height of the ridiculous is achieved when a man's heirs enjoy com-
pensation for their ancestor's prolonged suffering. Furthermore, 
115. See REsEARCH ON FATAL HIGHWAY COLLISIONS, PAPERS 1961-62 (Mosely ed.); id., 
PAPERS 1962·63, at 85-86. 
116. See JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 18-20, 37-38, 125-26 (1962) (quotation 
from Sir Patrick Devlin). 
117. See authorities cited in note 2 supra. 
December 1964] Automobile Injury Compensation 315 
nothing can expunge the sense of injustice accumulated through a 
long period of denial and uncertainty. The speeding up of settle-
ments (not merely trials) would do more to relieve the distress of 
injury victims than any other conceivable change in tort law ad-
ministration. 
There are two possible ways to speed up settlements. One is to 
speed up trials, so that judgment and execution can be obtained 
within a few months by anyone who wants a trial. This ideal, which 
is occupying the effort of scholars, lawyers, and judges, plays will-o' -
the-wisp with its pursuers. In Michigan there are twenty times as many 
serious cases susceptible of trial as are being tried; there are more than 
a hundred times as many cases of all degrees of seriousness as are 
being tried. It is not realistic to imagine that the number of con-
clusions by trial can be increased enough to reduce greatly trial de-
lay in large cities unless supplemented by radical measures. 
Even if it were possible to elect enough judges, build enough 
courtrooms, and draft enough jurors to cut down the trial backlog, 
a part of the problem would remain uncorrected. Lawyers would still 
threaten to hold out until trial as a bargaining device when they 
think the nerves or resources of the opponent are unequal to their 
own. Some incentive should be supplied for settling cases at reason-
able amounts when reasonable estimates at a probable trial outcome 
are not far apart. 
If early settlements could be promoted, there would be much 
more hope of reducing the backlog of cases seeking trial; in fact, this 
is the only realistic hope of cutting down the trial backlog. Earlier 
trials would mean speedier settlements for those who settle out of 
court as well as for those who go to trial. For the latter, it also would 
mean better trials, since the loss of witnesses and memories would 
be greatly reduced.118 
Some of the impediments to settlement have been clearly dis-
closed by recent research. One of these is the adherence by parties on 
both sides to concepts of total victory. Plaintiffs demand record-mak-
ing amounts; defendants make small offers, or none at all.119 What is 
needed is an increased incentive for each side to meet the other's 
terms. Foreign systems of law, particularly the British, have long 
known how to deal with this. They put the costs of litigation, in-
118. See the comment of James Marshall in The Unreality of Automobile Litiga-
tion, 50 A.B.A.J. 713, 715 (1964): "We know that there is a 'curve of forgetting' that 
is scoop-shaped, like the track of a ski jump." 
119. AACP 202-09. 
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eluding barristers' fees, on the losing party.120 An adaptation of this 
system is suggested for automobile personal injury claims in the 
United States. A plaintiff should be authorized to file in court a 
written demand for the settlement that he would accept. If it is not 
paid within thirty days and his eventual award is larger than the offer, 
the award should be augmented by litigation costs, including fees for 
attorneys' services incurred after the demand was filed. The demand 
should not be disclosed to the jury; the addition of costs should be 
made by the judge after the jury has returned its verdict. The judge 
could be given discretion to refuse to award costs in unusual 
circumstances.121 The effect of this device would be to create a real 
incentive to settle sooner rather than later; today, there is virtually 
none. However, it would not work in cases where the plaintiff's de-
mand is above the defendant's liability insurance limits unless 
another item were added. The insurance company should be liable 
for the litigation costs in addition to the policy limits. 
Defendants' liability insurers are not the only source of un-
reasonable refusals to settle. The record of high settlements in small 
loss cases and of settlements for "nuisance value" indicates that claim-
ants and their counsel are also contributors.122 A defendant should 
also be permitted to file a written offer of settlement; if it is not ac-
cepted and the eventual award is lower than the offer, the defend-
ant's expenses after the date of the offer should be deducted from 
any eventual award. 
If these devices seem radical to American readers, they should 
recall that liability for costs, including attorneys' fees, is a historic 
and time-tested instrument of justice in the English common-law 
system.123 
C. Enhancing Personal Responsibility 
One of the classic justifications of the tort system is that it places 
responsibility on the guilty tort-feasor; it is designed to create in 
every individual an incentive to avoid harming his fellow man. m 
120. AACP 434. For a collection of articles on the laws of several countries, indicat-
ing that the practice of making the unsuccessful party bear the others' costs is common 
in other legal systems, see 1962 PROC. SEC. OF INT'L AND COMP. LA.w, ABA 117 (1963). 
The committee report of which these articles are a part concludes with an article sug-
gesting adoption of a similar provision in American law. Geller, Unreasonable Refusal 
To Settle and Calendar Congestion-Suggested Remedy, 1962 PRoc. SEC. ON INT'L AND 
CoMP. LA.w, A.B.A. 134 (1963). 
121. Compare the plan proposed by Mr. Justice Geller. Ibid. 
122. See generally AACP 137-58. • 
123. See Geller, supra note 120. 
124. See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 549 (1948). 
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This is a commendable objective, but it has been largely eliminated 
in automobile cases by the prevalence of liability insurance.125 Since 
little thought and discussion have been given to this matter by 
others, the solutions that I propose may be startling in their novelty. 
They are proposed for examination and discussion, rather than for 
immediate adoption. 
The simplest means of increasing personal responsibility for 
careful driving would be to make the cost of driving increase sharp-
ly with accident experience. The annual cost of a driver's license 
could be raised as the result of involvement in an accident in the 
preceding year; if there were a tax on drivers' licenses to support re-
habilitation and subsistence for injury victims, this could increase 
with each accident involvement, regardless of fault. Unlike tort li-
ability, which is covered by insurance, the tax increase would be 
personally felt. Moreover, it would create an incentive to avoid ac-
cidents, rather than merely to avoid a finding of negligence. 
Another means of enhancing personal responsibility would be 
to increase the costs of insurance for persons who appear to be bad 
risks or who have unfavorable accident records. At present, although 
insurance renewals are often denied to "bad risks," they can usually 
become "assigned risks" with another company at a standard premi-
um. Insurance commissioners directly or indirectly discourage com-
panies from raising premiums for particular classes on the ground 
that the increases are not "actuarially justified"-a very technical 
standard. In this way, they prevent the companies from establishing 
classes that would operate as safety incentives. 
The insurance commissioners are doubtless justified in their pres-
ent reluctance to permit rates for disfavored classes to sky-rocket; the 
effect of high rates might be a lessening of insurance coverage of those 
from whom the public most needs protection. But if other means 
were provided for protecting injury victims-a rehabilitation plan, 
a subsistence program, and a basic income maintenance system-li-
ability insurance could more safely be left to the play of competitive 
forces. There seems to be plenty of price competition among insur-
ance companies, so that commissioner intervention is not needed to 
prevent the over-all premium level from rising too high.126 
125. AACP 265 table 8-5. 
126. "Since competition is an adequate barrier to excessive rates, the major concern 
of public control is with rate adequacy and company solvency." CRANE, AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 133 (1962). Company solvency can be maintained in a 
number of ways other than rate regulation. For examples and a discussion of their 
merits, see id. at 133-44. 
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A third possible means of enhancing personal responsibility 
would be to limit the completeness of insurance coverage. Perhaps 
all liability insurance tends to weaken personal responsibility; it is 
justified in most cases because compensation of loss to the claimant 
and avoidance of impoverishment of the defendant outweigh the 
responsibility objective. However, there are many situations in which 
the advantages of providing reparation are outweighed by the weak-
ening of personal responsibility. It has long been declared that in-
tentional assaults cannot be covered by liability insurance; it would 
be against public policy to protect one's self against liability for in-
tentional wrongdoing.127 For similar reasons, in all cases where reck-
lessness is charged, the jury should be required to separate compen-
satory damages from punitive damages. Liability insurance should 
cover only the former; there is no reason to admonish the insurance 
company.128 
A similar distinction might be drawn between damages for eco-
nomic loss and damages for psychic loss. It must be remembered that 
damages paid by insurance companies do not come only from wrong-
doers; they come from all the buyers of insurance, most of whom 
are quite guiltless of the accidents for which they indirectly pay. 
Probably no one would seriously advocate a tax upon all drivers to 
pay for the pain and suffering of the innocently injured, although at 
the present time that is the effect of damage awards for pain 
and suffering. Damages for pain and suffering are rationalized on the 
ground that potential wrongdoers should be deterred to the extent 
of the pain they will cause, as well as the economic loss. Therefore, 
these damages can do their appointed work only when they are paid 
from the wrongdoer's pocket; when they are coming from the right-
doers' pockets, they amount to unjust enrichment. 
To correct this anomaly is simple enough. Jurors could be in-
structed to identify damages for pain and suffering (like punitive 
damages) in a separate award, which insurance companies could be 
forbidden to cover. This reform would have very little practical ef-
fect on compensation of extremely serious and fatal injuries, because 
very little pain and suffering is paid for in those cases; usually not 
even the economic losses are fully covered. It might have a consider-
able effect on the nuisance value of small loss cases, where the danger 
127. See Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947). 
128. Cf. Note, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in Automobile 
Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REv. 1036 (1960). 
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of a large verdict based partly on pain and suffering frequently leads 
insurance companies to settle for more than economic loss. 
A fifth device for enhancing the responsibility of drivers, partic-
ularly uninsured drivers, would require a change in the law govern-
ing discharge of tort claims in bankruptcy. Ninety per cent of in-
dividual bankrupts have no assets that are liable to creditors.129 
When such a person suffers a tort judgment, as he may, he escapes 
scot-free. His only penalties for maiming or killing someone are his 
filing fees and attorney's fees in bankruptcy. He has little incentive 
to avoid accidents or even to insure; for many city-dwellers, going 
through bankruptcy is no more expensive than paying an insurance 
premium and is much less regular.130 
There is a simple treatment for this ill. Discharge of judgments 
for negligent injury should be awarded only in cases in which sub-
stantial assets are surrendered. Where the defendant has no assets, he 
should pay a reasonable portion of his wages for one, two, or three 
years. This could be achieved by making tort judgments discharge-
able only in proceedings under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 
where the judge may require periodic payments for a period of up 
to three years.181 
Besides admonishing negligent drivers, these changes would have 
a secondary beneficial effect. They would rebuild a public conscious-
ness that damages for negligence should be assessed only because the 
defendant is guilty, not merely because the plaintiff is needy. Such 
reforms perhaps could not be urged if tort law continued to be the 
only aid keeping an injury victim from destitution. When the rec-
ommended provisions for rehabilitation, subsistence, and wage re-
placement have been made, tort law can resume the function for 
which it is best designed-the reparation of the innocent at the ex-
pense of the guilty. 
129. Of all bankruptcies filed in fiscal year 1963, 89.5% were by non-business debtors. 
TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS 5 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 1964). 
Of all bankruptcies terminated in fiscal year 1963, 62.7% had no assets and an addi-
tional 11.4% had so few assets that they did not even cover the cost of the judicial ad-
ministration. Id. at 8. 
130. As early as 1932, an article in the Yale Law Journal suggested an appraisal of 
the function being performed by discharge in bankruptcy in light of the increasing 
number of automobile tort judgments being scheduled as the sole or at least the major 
liability. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329, 343 
(1932). 
131. It has been suggested that a provision be made for involuntary proceedings 
under chapter XIII. This would provide incentive for the debtor to forestall the cred-
itors by a voluntary petition and periodic payments. MacLachlan, Puritanical Therapy 
for Wage Earners, 68 CoM. L.J. 87, 89 (1963). 
320 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 611:279 
V. MODES OF SANCTION 
The "new prescriptions" proposed in this paper consist chiefly 
of objectives to be reached; the modes of sanction require further 
comment. Without detailing specific legal propositions, some general 
observations will be made concerning the choice of modes by which 
the desired ends can be achieved. 
A. The Multiplicity of Remedies 
The human mind longs for simplicity-for single formulas to 
solve myriad problems. The singular mode is nowhere better illus-
trated than in the tort action, which purports to supply in a single 
proceeding the means for meeting doctor bills, supplying subsis-
tence, restoring earnings, equalizing property losses, assuaging suffer-
ing, deterring negligence, punishing recklessness or wrong intent, 
and vindicating innocence. Although this diversity of aims is the 
reason for the failure of the tort remedy, the famous Columbia 
report, with incredible naivete, purported to supplant it with 
another single compensation plan, which was to do all that needed 
doing about automobile injuries.182 The sophisticated Connecticut 
case studies, which taught a less satisfying lesson, were tucked into 
an appendix.188 
As stated earlier in this article, one of the lessons of recent re-
search, foreshadowed by the Connecticut case studies, is that a multi-
plicity of remedies is already at work in automobile injury cases-
not only tort law, but also workmen's compensation, health insur-
ance, life insurance, collision insurance, Old Age, Survivors' and 
Disability Insurance, rehabilitation programs, and public assist-
ance.184 Each one of these programs does some part of the job dis-
tinctly better than alternatives can do it. A sensible program for 
automobile injuries would use each of these systems for the things it 
can do best; for the things that none of them does well, new regimes 
may have to be devised. A good program should include an extension 
of rehabilitation programs, an extension of social security, and a 
new program of basic income maintenance somewhat similar to 
workmen's compensation. Alongside these, there should be a contin-
uation of health insurance, life insurance, collision insurance, and 
tort law without basic change except to correlate them with other 
regimes. 
132. THE COLUMBIA REPORT 132. 
133. Id. at 218. 
134. See note 98 supra. 
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B. The Correlation of Regimes 
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The multiplicity of remedies should not be a subject of appre-
hension; it has the merit of reducing the seriousness of error made 
in employing any one of them 'alone. The problem of correlation 
;will not be immense as long as each regime has a special job that is 
distinct from the others. There will be no correlation problems 
among health insurance, life insurance, and subsistence provision, 
because each does a different job. There are, however, important 
potential overlaps between health insurance and rehabilitation; 
between subsistence provisions (social security) and basic income 
maintenance; between basic income maintenance and workmen's 
compensation; and between nearly every regime and tort law, 
which potentially covers every kind of loss. 
For all these correlations there should be a simple principle of 
preference. Where the benefits of two regimes are applicable, the need 
should be filled by the regime which functions with least expense, 
disturbance, and conflict. This is the principle that will do the most 
good for injury victims and have the least burden on the motorist 
or general taxpayers, who will eventually have to pay the bill in one 
form or another. 
This principle is just the opposite of that which the common law 
has evolved. The law has proceeded on the assumption that every 
loss should be shifted to the party whose fault caused it. Since the 
only system for assessing fault is the tort system, the result is imposi-
tion of the greatest possible burden on the group of premium pay-
ers who eventually pick up the bill. Not only does this require ad-
ministration by the most expensive system; it requires that many 
losses be administered twice-first by the particular loss insurance 
regime and second by the tort regime. 
The proposed preference system would be best effectuated by 
statutory rules for the most frequently recurring cases; but judges 
could fill in the interstices by following general principles. A few 
illustrations will indicate how it would work: 
(1) Hospital and medical bills would be paid by ordinary health 
insurance so far as possible and within policy limits; rehabilita-
tion funds would be drawn on in qualified cases when health 
insurance runs out. This is because rehabilitation is a more re-
strictive concept, involving more arguable distinctions than gen-
eral hospital and medical care. 
(2) Sick leave pay and group disability benefits paid by the 
employer or his insurance company would be paid regardless 
of the availability of social security and a basic income main-
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tenance plan, because the former involve the least disturbance 
of the existing payment plan. 
(3) Basic income maintenance should begin when employer and 
employer-financed payments stop. 
(4) Subsistence payments from the social security regime should 
begin when employer payments or basic income maintenance 
payments stop. Although social security payments are perhaps 
more "efficient" than the others, the benefits would be lower 
than under other systems, and it is probably cheaper to have 
only one system supporting the beneficiary at one time. 
(5) Payments from all these sources-health insurance, rehabili-
tation services, sick leave, social security, basic income mainten-
ance-should be deductible from tort damages. 
C. The Level of the Burden on Automobilists 
Most legal writing, including the foregoing lines of this piece, 
has assumed that motorists ought to pay the full costs of injuries 
attributed to the operation of automobiles, insofar as these can be 
determined. This is based either upon the price theory, which 
asserts that the price of using automobiles should include the costs 
of such use, or upon the incentive theory, which asserts that auto-
mobilists should be given an incentive to avoid accidents that is at 
least equal to the costs of the accidents they cause. 
The price theory is a corollary of the general proposition that 
explains that cake should be dearer than bread because it requires 
more butter, and hand-tailored clothes more expensive than ma-
chine-made ones because the former require more labor.1311 It is not 
very conclusive, however, because there are many economic goods 
for which society does not even attempt to charge the full costs to 
the users.136 Education, police protection, and sidewalks are good 
examples. Transportation has always been a hybrid case, with some 
of the costs borne by users and some by the public via subsidies for 
building railroads and airports and direct public expenditure for 
public road-building; the bearing of part of the costs by the public 
seems to be thoroughly justified by the countless indirect benefits of 
transportation. Among the conspicuous contemporary benefits of the 
automobile is the ability of millions of laboring people to live in 
suburban communities with grass and flowers, instead of in urban 
tenements. 
It seems futile to argue that motorists should pay the full costs 
135. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499 (1961). 
136. For a review of theory on the social utility of compensation in relation to 
reparation problems, see AACP 108-36. 
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of automobile accidents. It would be more cogent to urge that auto-
mobile costs be made to include the costs of injury to the same ex-
tent as the economic units with which they compete. As means of 
essential transportation, they compete chiefly with common carriers, 
which probably pay more completely for the injuries they cause than 
do private automobile owners. Carriers are generally financially 
able to pay the entire losses, instead of escaping payment (as do unin-
sured automobilists) or paying only up to a modest insurance limit 
(as frequently do insured automobilists). 
There is another reason why the price argument is imperfectly 
applicable to automobile accidents. While every cake or suit of 
clothes has costs that are uniform for that kind of commodity, the 
amount of losses caused by the automobile varies immensely from 
driver to driver and from automobile to automobile. There is no 
particular merit in putting a high price on the driving of a man who 
will never cause a serious accident. Yet, virtually all the devices of 
automobile injury reparation result in spreading costs over the 
entire body of drivers with very little differentiation. If the entire 
costs of automobile injuries were spread in the same way, it is quite 
conceivable that thousands of safe drivers would be priced off the 
road by the activities of relatively few dangerous ones. 
If one turns from the price theory to the incentive theory, one 
finds even less reason for placing all the costs of automobile injuries 
on the motorists. Accidents can be avoided not only by motorists, but 
also by pedestrians. They can also be diminished by building safer 
highways, cutting out flashing electric signs, and moderating the sale 
of liquor at roadside taverns. 
Thus, it seems unsound to argue that the total costs of automo-
bile injuries must be relentlessly spread among motorists rather than 
being picked up by systems of health insurance or social security or 
borne in some part by the initial victims. On the contrary, it seems 
sensible to let some of the minor costs lie upon their initial victims, 
to cover some costs with general health and welfare programs, to 
charge some to automobilists as a class through insurance, and to 
see that a few of the costs come out of the private pocketbooks of 
negligent drivers. 
No one has yet proposed a formula for deciding how much of 
the total cost should be borne in each way. The bearing of about a 
fourth of the total costs by motorists through liability insurance does 
not seem prima facie excessive. But when the cost of liability insur-
ance for a car owned by a young bachelor rises to about 350 dollars 
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per year, as it does in Brooklyn, N. Y., it seems likely that the impedi-
ment to automobile ownership has risen too high.137 
D. The Taxing of Automobilists 
At least two, and possibly three, of the new prescriptions that I 
have proposed in the preceding pages could be supported by taxes 
on automobilists. These taxes might take any number of forms. 
There might be a tax on new automobile sales, or on annual auto-
mobile registrations, or on the gasoline and tires consumed by auto-
mobilists, or on drivers' licenses. In fact, all of these elements are 
presently taxed, and some of the existing taxes might be regarded 
as motorists' contributions to the rehabilitation or subsistence fund. 
But increased taxes will certainly be required, and lawmakers 
should consider where they can be applied with optimum efficiency. 
The most useful form of tax on new automobile sales would be 
one that discriminated among types of automobiles in relation to their 
tendency to produce accidents. The type of survey made by the 
Cornell University Automotive Crash Injury Research could no 
doubt yield statistics to show whether it is true, as some writers 
charge, that sports cars, or convertibles, or super-powered cars occa-
sion larger numbers of injuries than others.138 If so, they should 
make heavier contributions to the reparation of injuries. This would 
be much more sensible than taxing them according to their gross 
value, which results in increasing the extra costs of seat belts, power 
brakes, padded dashboards, and all other safety devices. 
Another important question to determine is whether old cars 
cause a disproportionate number of injuries.139 If so, a heavy tax on 
new cars would have the undesired effect of increasing the costs of 
replacing an old car with a new one. On the other hand, a heavy 
registration tax would tend to diminish the apparent relative econ-
omy of keeping an old car. Where safety inspections are not re-
137. AACP 94 n.34. 
138. See, e.g., KEATS, THE INSOLENT CHARIOTS 23 (1958); see generally O'Connell, 
T,aming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 334-56 (1963). 
139. Studies have shown a statistical correlation between the old age and high mile-
age of cars and higher accident rates. E.g., Schreiber &: Schecter, Effects of Aging and 
Mileage on the Accident Rates of Vehicles, in PASSENGER CAR DESIGN AND HIGHWAY 
SAFETY 122, 123 (1962). States that require vehicles to pass periodic inspection have con-
sistently lower death rates than those that do not require such inspection. Lowery, 
Vehicle Condition and Periodic Safety Inspections, in id. at 109, ll0. 
O'Connell suggests that many old cars are driven by young drivers and calls the 
combination of the most dangerous cars and the most dangerous drivers "potentially 
disastrous." O'Connell, supra note 138. 
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quired, tax reductions could be awarded to older cars that pass an 
inspection of their brakes, tires, lights, doors, and seat belts. 
An important potential source of revenue, virtually untapped, is 
the driver's license. For the most part, these have been issued at a 
minimum price. It might be a very wholesome thing to make a 
driver's license at least as expensive as an automobile license. It 
would also be useful to have different fees for different classes of 
drivers. It is much more appropriate to raise the drivers' license fees 
of young men than to raise the cost of the insurance bought by the 
young men's fathers. 
E. The Federal-State Puzzle 
No sensitive American can escape a twinge of nostalgia as he 
sees an area of law, once sacred to the delightful localism of state 
law, succumb to the necessities of federalism. But the automobile is 
the most literal example of a subject on which state particularism 
belongs to the horse and buggy days. 
The objectives of any plan to improve automobile accident repar-
ation are to eliminate impoverishments that result from them and to 
spread the costs equitably among those who cause them. Any pro-
gram that seeks to alleviate these evils on a statewide basis is boxing 
with shadows. States like California and Michigan are tourist meccas, 
seasonally inundated with out-of-state automobiles and drivers. 
States like Illinois and New York are crossroads for traffic that neither 
originates nor terminates within the state. These states may impose 
heavy burdens on their own motorists in order to protect their citi-
zens from serious loss, only to have them exposed to the less regulated 
drivers of other states. One is tempted to advocate that every state 
border should have, as in Europe, a police check of insurance certifi-
cates; but on one wants to put that kind of a burden on the interstate 
flow of traffic. 
Any program for the aid of automobile injury victims will be 
more effective if built on a federal base. The rehabilitation program, 
the subsistence program, and the wage replacement program would 
be most effective if national in scope. This proposal does not ex-
clude administration by state agencies under national norms, just as 
existing rehabilitation programs and unemployment insurance are 
conducted. 
There is no need to impose corresponding federal uniformity on 
tort law. Here there is still room for Cardozo's "state laboratory" 
concept. But federal law should impose a uniform federal rule for 
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the deductibility of benefits from the federally imposed programs, in 
order to prevent a perversion of the programs by the inertia or con-
fusion of state legislatures. 
VI. SUMMARY 
Recent empirical research makes possible new and fresh ap-
proaches to the problem of economic reparation for automobile in-
juries. As a lawyer who has been engaged in some of the research 
~ and who has given some thought to its implications, I present the 
following as some of my personal conclusions: 
I. The way ahead is not through a single plan for automobile 
injuries; it is through keeping alive the plurality of existing pro-
grams-from social security to tort damages-with some extensions, 
additions, and correlations. 
2. One urgent need that should be filled immediately is the adop-
tion of a program that would provide rehabilitation, from surgery 
to vocational retraining, for every automobile injury victim, regard-
less of the circumstances of his injury. 
3. A second urgent need is an extension of subsistence through 
the social security system to automobile injury victims and depend-
ents of victims who are not now "fully covered" because they have 
not spent enough time in "covered employment." 
4. A third desideratum-although less urgent than the preced-
ing ones-is a program of basic income maintenance for wage earn-
ers; this would not apply to non-wage-earners. 
5. Tort actions would continue, but damage rules should be re-
vised to deduct from recoverable damages the amounts that injury 
victims have recovered or can recover from health insurance, re-
habilitation programs, social security, and disability insurance. 
6. Measures should be taken to enhance the personal responsibil-
ity of tort-feasors. Suggested for consideration are exclusion of puni-
tive damages and psychic damages from insurance coverage; denial 
of unconditional bankruptcy discharges for personal injury judg-
ments; permitting insurance companies to set up safety incentive 
rates without regard to "actuarial justification." 
7. Incentives to make and accept reasonable settlement offers 
shoul!l be increased by assessing the opponents' full costs of litiga-
tion on the party who rejects a reasonable settlement offer. 
8. The classic "automobile injury compensation plan" and the 
more recent compulsory liability insurance laws are decidedly in-
ferior to other practicable treatments of the reparation problem. 
